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Contingent Capital in Executive
Compensation
Wulf A. Kaal*
Abstract
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate
governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent
convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack
governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of
contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in
executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to
the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to
executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early
triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in
addition to lowering income inequality and increasing
sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for
executives to lower risk-taking, improve signaling of default risk, and
increase incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders. The
recognition of ownership characteristics in design features adds an
important element to the literature on contingent capital trigger
designs. The methodological assumptions of incomplete contract
theory can improve the analysis of executive compensation
arrangements.
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I. Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Financial Crisis),
existing executive compensation policies and the level of
executive compensation have been increasingly scrutinized.1
1. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 61–66 (2011) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], http://fcic-static.
law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (investigating
the causes of the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2010); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249
(2010) (explaining how banks’ executive pay has produced incentives for
excessive risk-taking and how such pay should be reformed); Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP.
L. 647, 649 (2005) (critiquing pay arrangements and corporate governance
processes producing them); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming
Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE
J. ON REG. 359, 363 (2009) (suggesting that executive incentive compensation
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Lucian Bebchuk and his coauthors show in several pieces that
existing executive compensation practices have resulted in
suboptimal incentives for executives.2 The level of executive
compensation in the United States3 and the focus on equity-based
plans should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options); Claire
Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of
Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 369 (2009) (arguing that
courts are not well equipped to deal with structural bias); Richard A. Posner,
Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1026 (2009) (discussing the compensation of
publicly owned U.S. company executives); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of
Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 196–97 (2011) (arguing that
the Dodd–Frank Act did not adequately reform executive compensation
schemes); Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too
Much?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (analyzing how executives and
managers should be paid to benefit companies’ long term health); Carola
Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16585, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w
16585 (surveying recent literature on CEO compensation).
2. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The
Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–
2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010); see also Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1,
at 274–75 (arguing that because shareholders are incentivized to encourage
management to take risks beyond the socially optimal level, corporate
governance reforms should include reforms of executive compensation policies).
Because of implicit government guarantees for bank debt, existing executive
compensation policies do not incentivize bondholders and other creditors to
monitor risk-taking by executives. Id.
3. According to a 2012 report by the Economic Policy Institute, CEO
compensation grew more than 725% from 1978 to 2011, compared to 5.7% for
worker compensation. LAWRENCE MISHEL & NATALIE SABADISH, ECON. POLICY
INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 331, CEO PAY AND THE TOP 1%: HOW EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND FINANCIAL-SECTOR PAY HAVE FUELED INCOME INEQUALITY 4
(2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-per cent.pdf. The CEO–
worker compensation ratio in 2011 was 231.0-to-1 if stock options realized were
counted, 209.4-to-1 if stock options granted were counted. Id. at 6. The Wall
Street Journal/Hay Group CEO Compensation 2011 Study reveals that although
pay levels flattened due to “say-on-pay” provisions, long-term equity grants were
up 34% from 2010 levels. WALL ST. J. & HAY GROUP, 2011 CEO COMPENSATION
STUDY SUMMARY 2 (2012), http://www.haygroup.com/downloads/ww/WSJ_
Hay_Group_2011_Study_Summary_Results_FINAL_5.20.12.pdf. According to
Bebchuk and Grinstein, between 1993 and 2003 the aggregate compensation of
the top five executives in the United States amounted to over $351 billion.
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 283, 297 (2005), http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/
21/2/283.full.pdf+html. Over the same time period (1993–2003), executive
compensation at S&P 500 firms rose on average from $3.7 million to $9.1
million. Id. at 285.
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compensation in executive pay packages may have resulted in
inappropriate executive risk-taking,4 short-termism,5 a lack of
sustainability, income inequality, and a classic moral hazard
problem.6
For more than three decades, theoretical research on
executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on
adjusting executive compensation with equity-based products
alone, such as stocks and stock options.7 While equity-based
compensation policies may increase risk-taking, some empirical
studies have shown that risk-taking can decline if executives hold
more debt relative to their equity holdings.8 An increasing part of
4. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 61–66 (discussing executive
compensation as a cause of the Financial Crisis).
5. Id.
6. Executive remuneration via stock options resulted in executives
sharing in shareholders’ gain but insulated them from shareholders’ losses. This
may have led executives to use excessively risky strategies because there was no
penalty for management. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 249–50
(discussing the role of excessive risk-taking in the financial sector and its impact
on the Financial Crisis); see also Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 2, at
259 (analyzing executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman from 2000–
2008); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the
Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12 (2011) (arguing that the most plausible
explanation for these findings is that CEOs “took actions that they believed the
market would welcome,” but “[e]x post, these actions were costly to their
banks”); Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better
During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance
and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15180,
2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf.
7. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–Jun. 1990, at 138 (showing that
it is more important to focus on the form of executive compensation than the
amount of compensation).
8. See Cory A. Cassell, Shawn X. Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez & Michael
D. Stuart, Seeking Safety: The Relation Between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and
the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 588,
599 (2012) (studying the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the
riskiness of firm investment and financial policies); Rangarajan K. Sundaram &
David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial
Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007) (discussing the shift away from
equity incentives and toward debt incentives as CEOs get older); Joseph
Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal
Contracting 23 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2007-5, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982180 (finding that pension benefits may
reduce risk-taking); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 18–19 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
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the literature is now considering the role of debt for manager
incentives (the creditor-centered approach).9 Debt in executive
compensation packages can help lower risk incentives, lower
income inequality, address short-termism, and create
sustainability.10
The benefits of debt in executive compensation packages can
be enhanced by using contingent convertible bonds (CCBs),11
which can either be written down or converted into equity upon a
triggering event.12 Unlike traditional contingent convertible
Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011) [hereinafter Tung & Wang], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161 (finding that banks with higher CEO debt–
equity ratios are likely to take less risk and perform better during a financial
crisis than those with lower CEO debt–equity ratios); Chenyang Wei & David
Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives (Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y., Staff Report No. 445, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604046 (noting that many studies have found that
firms face a lower cost of debt when the CEO has a high ratio of inside-debt-toinside-equity compensation). Other studies reject the idea that executive
compensation and risk-taking are correlated. See Fahlenbach & Stulz, supra
note 6, at 12 (arguing that the link between incentive and risk-taking is not
proven); Andrew C. W. Lund, Compensation as Signaling, 64 FLA. L. REV. 591,
593 (2012) (stating that the interest in executives’ pay structure as related to
concerns about risk-taking is misplaced); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O.
Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159, 183 (2010) (arguing that the
prevailing view, which suggests altering executives’ compensation packages,
may not be the solution to excessive risk-taking).
9. Bebchuk and Spamann propose tying executive pay to a specified
percentage of the aggregate value of the common shares, the preferred shares,
and the bonds issued by a bank or its holding company. Bebchuk & Spamann,
supra note 1, at 253. John Coffee recommends using “contingent capital,” a debt
security that converts to a fixed return preferred stock with cumulative
arrearages and significant voting rights. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After
Dodd–Frank : Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond
Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 806 (2011). Hill and Painter argue that
bankers should have some personal liability and suggest two approaches:
mandatory partnership/joint venture agreements and assessable stock. Claire
Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1173, 1175 (2010). Fred Tung suggests paying bankers partly with their
banks’ public subordinated debt securities. Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 15 NW.
U. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2011).
10. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1.
11. Other terms for contingent capital securities (CCSs) include contingent
convertible bonds (CCBs), or CoCos. This Article will predominantly refer to
these hybrid instruments as contingent convertible bonds or CCBs.
12. See CHARLES HIMMELBERG, AMANDA HINDLION, SANDRA LAWSON &
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bonds issued to investors, the emphasis for contingent convertible
bonds in executive compensation is not on a capital infusion when
the Systematically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) is in a
crisis,13 but rather on governance-improving designs to help
optimize management’s incentives.14 Adding contingent
convertible bonds with an early trigger to the calibration of
executive compensation packages could improve the corporate
governance of SIFIs.15 More specifically, contingent convertible
bonds with early triggers in executive compensation packages can
help to improve incentives for risk-taking by executives, facilitate
monitoring by creditors and shareholders, align executives’
interests with those of different constituents, promote
sustainability, and reduce income inequality.16
Using contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in
executive compensation is not a mere theoretical proposal.
LOUISE PITT, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., CONTINGENT CAPITAL:
POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011) [hereinafter GOLDMAN
SACHS],
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatoryreform/contingent-capital.pdf; STEVE STRONGIN, AMANDA HINDLION & SANDRA
LAWSON, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., EFFECTIVE REGULATION: PART 5:
ENDING “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter GOLDMAN SACHS TBTF],
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/ef
fect-reform-part-5.pdf (explaining the triggering process for contingent capital).
13. See George Pennacchi, Theo Vermaelen & Christian C.P. Wolff,
Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs 9 (INSEAD, Working Paper No.
2010/89/FIN, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1656994 (explaining how COERC bonds work).
14. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible
Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2012) (summarizing the possible applications of
contingent convertible bonds in corporate governance); see also Wulf A. Kaal &
Christoph K. Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 221 (2012). The conversion feature of CCBs and the threat of
dilution for equity holders could change the power structure, control dynamic,
and dependencies within SIFIs. The market in contingent convertible bonds is
slowly evolving. See infra Part VI.B. With increasing issuances, contingent
capital design features will continue to develop. The efficient functioning of
contingent capital designs could benefit from experimentation and a learning
experience that takes into account corporate governance considerations.
Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, CCBs, as an internal
institution-specific mechanism, could help fill the void left by regulators’
seeming inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.
15. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 807 (discussing how implementing an early
trigger for conversion may deter excessive risk-taking).
16. See infra Part V.B.2.
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Barclays, Inc. (Barclays) has already issued contingent capital
securities to its executives under its Contingent Capital Plan
(CCP).17 Barclays’s CCP, however, does not allow for conversion
from debt into equity, much less with an early trigger before any
other contingent convertible bonds can be triggered. Barclays’s
issuance seems to serve a mere signaling function, only
marginally improves corporate governance, and leaves the
incentives for executives untouched. The design adjustment
proposed in this Article helps optimize the effectiveness and
corporate governance improvements of contingent convertible
bonds in executive compensation.
This Article includes five Parts. Part II evaluates reform
proposals for executive compensation policies before and after the
enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act and demonstrates that the
creditor-centered approach to executive compensation adds
important elements to the debate on reform proposals. Part III
introduces the concept of contingent capital securities, contingent
capital’s quasi-public-good characteristics, and the possible
application of contingent capital bonds for corporate governance
improvements in SIFIs. Part IV shows that the relational
elements in executive compensation contracts are inadequately
acknowledged by classical contract theory and spot contract
theory. The shortcomings in the analysis of executive
compensation contracts under the classical contract model and
spot contract model can be overcome with the methodological
assumptions of the relational or incomplete contract model in
New Institutional Economics. Part V introduces the idea of
contingent capital bonds in executive compensation and
highlights the design and governance shortcomings in Barclays’s
Contingent Capital Plan. Part V shows that contingent
convertible bonds with early triggers can add important elements
to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered
approach to executive compensation. The recognition of
17. See BARCLAYS, BARCLAYS PLC ANNUAL REPORT 2010 172 (2010)
[hereinafter BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT], http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/
Annual_Report_2010.pdf (stating that 50% of the deferred incentive rewards
will be contingent capital awards under the CCP); Megan Murphy & Jennifer
Hughes, Barclays Causes a Stir with Cocos Plan, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at
22 (discussing the issuance of contingent convertible bonds as part of employees’
bonuses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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ownership characteristics in design features also adds an
important element to the literature on contingent capital trigger
designs.
II. Reform Proposals for Executive Compensation
Corporate governance reform proposals after the Financial
Crisis have recognized the importance of executive
compensation.18 Although the effects of equity-based
compensation are unclear and are the subject of a long
academic debate,19 equity-based compensation predominates
18. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission lists executive compensation
as one of the primary factors contributing to the crisis (among other factors such
as lack of transparency, excessive borrowing, and high risk investments). FINAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at xix, xxvi. Executive compensation takes a prominent
role among other important factors (such as accounting, liquidity, and capital
regulation) in the Financial Services Authority’s Turner Review in the United
Kingdom. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 80 (2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/
turner_review.pdf (highlighting contributing factors and international
approaches to banking reform).
19. See generally Christopher S. Armstrong & Rahul Vashishtha, Executive
Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value, 104 J. FIN.
ECON. 70 (2012); John M. Barron & Glen R. Waddell, Work Hard, Not Smart:
Stock Options in Executive Compensation, 6 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 767 (2008);
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 27 (2003); John E.
Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation
Broken?, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 97 (2005); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1;
Stephen Bryan, Robert Nash & Ajay Patel, Can the Agency Costs of Debt and
Equity Explain the Changes in Executive Compensation During the 1990s?, 12 J.
CORP. FIN. 516 (2006); James Cash Acrey, William R. McCumber & Thu Hien T.
Nguyen, CEO Incentives and Bank Risk, 63 J. ECON. & BUS. 456 (2011); Ingolf
Dittman, Ernst Maug & Dan Zhang, Restricting CEO Pay, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1200
(2011); Frydman & Jenter, supra note 1; Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy,
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2002);
Huasheng Gao, Optimal Compensation Contracts When Managers Can Hedge,
97 J. FIN. ECON. 218 (2010); Mao-Wei Hung, Yu-Jane Lio & Chia-Fen Tsai,
Managerial Personal Diversification and Portfolio Equity Incentives, 18 J. CORP.
FIN. 38 (2012); Christine Hurt, Regulating Compensation, 6 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 21 (2011); Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives,
66 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (2002); Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked
Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock
Options, 30 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2001); Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock:
Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J.
FIN. 1367 (2000); Sepe, supra note 1; Wei & Yermack, supra note 8; Sudhakar
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executive compensation in the United States.20 The focus on
equity-based compensation in executive compensation
packages may have resulted in short-termism, suboptimal
incentives for managers, a lack of sustainability, income
inequality, and a classic moral hazard problem.21 The
appropriate response to the shortcomings in equity-based
executive compensation is debated among academics22 and
Balachandran, Bruce Kogut & Hitesh Harnal, The Probability of Default,
Excessive Risk, and Executive Compensation: A Study of Financial Service Firms
from 1995–2008 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper, Working Paper, 2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914542;
Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, Executive Compensation and
Risk Taking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 456, 2011),
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The
Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay (Columbia Law Sch. & Eur. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 373, 2010) [hereinafter Executive Compensation],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633906.
20. See DANIEL A. COHEN, AIYESHA DEY & THOMAS Z. LYS, THE SARBANES–
OXLEY ACT OF 2002: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPENSATION STRUCTURE AND RISKTAKING INCENTIVES OF CEOS 29 (2004), http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/
Bhagat/SOX-CEO-Compensation-Investment.pdf (covering the period from 1992
to 2003 and dividing compensation into fixed salary, bonuses, and options);
Cassell et. al., supra note 8, at 597 (depicting CEO-to-firm debt–equity ratio);
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1553 (defining the ratio of equity-toinside-debt as benefit pensions and deferred compensation); Tung & Wang,
supra note 8, at 13 (measuring debt as defined benefit pension and deferred
compensation).
21. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 249–50 (discussing problems
in bank executives’ pay, possible remedies, and government intervention);
Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 2, at 259 (analyzing executive
compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman from 2000–2008); Fahlenbrach &
Stulz, supra note 6, at 12 (arguing that the most plausible explanation for these
findings is that CEOs “took actions that they believed the market would
welcome,” but “[e]x post, these actions were costly to their banks”); Beltratti &.
Stulz, supra note 6, at 1–2 (investigating limitations for bank performance
during the Financial Crisis).
22. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration after the
Global Financial Crisis: Common Law Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
EXECUTIVE PAY (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2012) (discussing
the nexus between executive compensation and the Financial Crisis); Bebchuk
& Spamann, supra note 1 (analyzing how banks’ compensation structures
produced incentives for excessive risk-taking); see also Posner, supra note 1, at
1040–41 (arguing that, while the Financial Crisis cannot be attributed directly
to executive overcompensation, CEOs have an incentive to increase leverage
because of compensation tied by stock options to share value, generous
severance packages, etc.); FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xix (stating that
“compensation systems—designed in an environment of cheap money, intense
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policy makers.23 The debate pre- and post- Dodd–Frank Act has
been shaped by the apparent shortcomings in equity-based
competition, and light regulation—too often rewarded the quick deal, the shortterm gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences”). “Often,
those systems encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be
huge and the downside limited. This was the case up and down the line—from
the corporate boardroom to the mortgage broker on the street.” Id. But see
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 6, at 11–12 (investigating whether bank
performance during the recent credit crisis is related to CEO incentives before
the crisis and finding some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives
were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no
evidence that they performed better); Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 6, at 2–5
(examining whether bank performance is related to bank-level governance,
country-level governance, country-level regulation, and bank balance sheet and
profitability characteristics before the crisis).
23. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
COMPENSATION
PRACTICES:
IMPLEMENTATION
STANDARDS
(2009),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf
(providing
specific recommendations regarding world-wide standards for corporate pay
structure, disclosure, and transparency); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS AND MAIN
MESSAGES
14–31
(2009),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/10/43056196.pdf
(analyzing “major corporate governance weaknesses” and outlining “a set of key
findings and main messages”); DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS 106–27 (2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf (examining corporate
governance practices and the appropriate balance between restraints on financial
institution boards and flexibility for those boards to make effective strategic
business decisions); see also Remuneration Code, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/remuneration/index.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (providing a listing of FSA materials on remuneration) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Remuneration Policies, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.
htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (listing European Union materials on directors’
remuneration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Paul Davies et
al., European Company Law Experts’ Response to the European Commission’s
Green Paper ‘The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ 9–12 (Working Paper,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912548
(suggesting that corporate governance should address three agency problems:
(1) “those between the management . . . and the shareholders” where
shareholdings are dispersed; (2) “those between controlling and non-controlling
shareholders” where shareholdings are concentrated; and (3) those between
controllers and non-shareholder stakeholders); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 951
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1), 952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3), 954 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-4), 956 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641); COMM. OF EUROPEAN
BANKING SUPERVISORS (CEBS), GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (2010), http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards
%20and%20Guidelines/2010/Remuneration/Guidelines.pdf (exploring the effect of
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executive compensation, by experiences with Enron and other
financial scandals, and by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, as well as by
the Financial Crisis. Recent efforts to include debt-based
instruments in executive compensation could help address many
of the shortcomings in equity-based compensation.
A. Pre Dodd–Frank Act
There is some evidence that executive compensation played a
role in governance shortcomings before the Enron scandal.24
Despite this evidence, the regulatory response after the collapse
of Enron focused predominantly on audit failure.25 Executive
compensation was only marginally addressed in the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act (SOX).26 Increased shareholder involvement in
remuneration, requirements on risk alignment and disclosure in the context of
remuneration policies and practices); FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR
SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_0904b.pdf (describing the FSF Principles for Sound
Compensation Practices and how they apply to major financial institutions).
24. See John C. Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 273, 297–98 (2004)
(discussing the Enron collapse and the economic incentives in the broader
context of the society and culture of the 1990s).
25. See John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302–62 (2004) (exploring
the role of “gatekeepers,” or independent professionals who spend great effort to
protect disparate investors who are unable to protect themselves from corporate
or institutional abuse); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2002) (discussing Enron’s collapse
and ramifications for the greater business world).
26. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1079 (D. Ariz. 2010) (providing some clarification
by requiring personal misconduct by the issuer, not the executive, to grant
recovery under SOX § 304); Coffee, supra note 24, at 269–71 (considering
executive compensation as a possible cause for the Enron scandal and the
eventual collapse of Enron); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay:” Cautionary Notes
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 323, 333–34 (2009) (discussing the lacking effectiveness of SOX § 304);
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1162–63, 1190–92 (2004) (describing
shareholder approval of equity compensation plans under SOX and various
NYSE and NASDAQ responses to SOX); Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation
Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 509 (2005)
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executive compensation, director elections, and other corporate
governance matters were notably absent from the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. Reform proposals after the Enron scandal but before
the Financial Crisis and the eventual enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act focused in part on increasing shareholder involvement,
linking compensation to executive performance, and optimizing
transparency.
Before the Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act that would eventually include provisions to enhance
shareholder involvement, proposals for reform included attempts
to establish say-on-pay plans requiring a stockholder vote on
manager compensation.27 The United Kingdom implemented a
say-on-pay scheme in 200228 and Germany began allowing

(“The majority of Sarbanes-Oxley is not dedicated to executive compensation
issues. . . .”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529, 1538 (2005) (criticizing SOX
§ 402, which prohibits personal loans to directors and officers).
27. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 1, at 369; see also Randall S. Thomas,
Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd–Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975866
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Gordon, supra note 26 (assessing hypothetical mandatory federal
rule in the U.S. in light of the U.K. experience with a similar regulation adopted
in 2002 and arguing for a federally mandated shareholder opt-in right to a “say
on pay” regime, which would change the current reliance on “precatory
proposals”); see generally Walid Alissa, Boards’ Response to Shareholders’
Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK (Working
Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1412880 (examining how the U.K. regulation affected the actions of
shareholders and boards and finding evidence that shareholders sometimes
used their vote to convey dissatisfaction with excessive compensation); Martin J.
Conyon & Graham V. Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration
Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK (AAA 2010 Mgmt. Acct. Sec. (MAS)
Meeting Paper, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457921 (investigating U.K. shareholder
voting and finding that less than 10% of shareholders abstain or vote against
the “mandated Directors’ Remuneration Report”); Fabrizio Ferri & David A.
Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, REV.
FIN. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (examining “say on pay” regulation in the U.K. and
finding that the regulation’s announcement led to a positive stock price reaction
at firms with weak penalties for undesirable performance) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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nonbinding votes on management compensation by shareholders
during the annual meeting in 2010.29
Other reform proposals before the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act focused on linking pay with executive performance.
Proposals in this context included tying executive compensation
to the entity’s performance by granting stock options,30 back
loading executive compensation and tying it to the future
performance of the company,31 prohibiting severance pay,32 and
granting restricted stock with a mandatory holding period.33
Other proposals to increase executive performance suggest a
reduction in equity compensation and bonuses caused by
industry-based movements and changes in the economy,34
awarding bonuses only for accounting improvements that are
sustained
over
time,35
and
curtailing
“soft-landing”
36
arrangements.
Another major focus of reform proposals before the
enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act had been transparency in the
disclosure of executives’ compensation packages. Proposals to
improve transparency included placing a dollar value on all

29. See Marc Steffen Rapp, Marco O. Sperling & Michael Wolff, Wer Fragt
die
Aktionäre?—Abstimmung
über
das
Vorstandsvergütungssystem:
Erfahrungen aus der HV-Saison 2010 [Who is Asking the Shareholders? Voting
on Management Compensation in German Listed Firms—Evidence from the
Annual Meeting Season 2010] (HHL Research Paper Series in Corp. Governance
No. 2, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723155 (examining the determinants affecting the
likelihood of voting and the result of the vote, and finding that the likelihood of
voting increases with a higher free float and large media exposure and the
introduction of a new remuneration system leads to a higher approval rate).
30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 355–57 (1976); see also Frydman, supra note 1, at 5 (surveying recent
literature on CEO compensation).
31. Posner, supra note 1, at 1045.
32. Id.
33. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 363; Samuelson & Stout, supra note
1, at A13.
34. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 669.
35. Id. at 670.
36. See id. at 671–72 (stating that these arrangements “provide generous
compensation for executives being pushed out due to failure” and narrow “the
payoff gap between good and poor performance”).
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elements of executive compensation37 and disclosing the value in
SEC filings,38 disclosing sales of equity instruments,39 disclosing
nondeductible compensation,40 appointing a compensation
representative to represent shareholder interests in setting
executive pay,41 and appointing a “high-quality” compensation
committee consisting of experienced, independent members.42
B. Post Dodd–Frank Act
Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act43 as a response to the
Financial Crisis. The Act adopted many of the suggestions from
the precrisis literature on executive compensation and added
other safeguards. The Dodd–Frank Act’s provisions pertaining to
executive compensation provide for a nonbinding shareholder
vote to approve executive compensation,44 disclosure of
relationship between executive compensation and the financial

37. Posner, supra note 1, at 1045.
38. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 668.
39. Id. at 668–69.
40. Id. at 668.
41. Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent
Solution to Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 473–74 (2007).
42. Jerry Sun & Steven Cahan, The Effect of Compensation Committee
Quality on the Association Between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting
Performance, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 193, 194 (2009) (stating that
empirical evidence has shown that compensation committees can prevent
executives from behaving opportunistically); see also Patricia M. Dechow, Mark
R. Huson & Richard G. Sloan, The Effect of Restructuring Charges on Executives’
Cash Compensation, 69 ACCT. REV. 138, 139 (1994); Memorandum from
Jeannemarie O’Brien, David E. Kahan & Samuel E. Eckman, SEC Issues Final
Dodd–Frank Rules on Independence of Compensation Committee and Its
Advisers (June 21, 2012) (discussing compensation committee independence,
advisor independence, disclosure, and exemptions) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); SEC Listing Standards For Compensation Committees,
17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240 (2012) (directing the national securities exchanges to bar
the listing of any equity securities of a company not in compliance with the
compensation committee and compensation adviser requirements of Section 10C
of the Exchange Act).
43. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7, 12, 15, 22, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
44. Id. § 951.
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performance of the entity,45 disclosure of the annual total
compensation of the CEO and the relationship to the median
annual compensation of employees,46 disclosure of hedging
behavior,47 claw-back provisions,48 an independent compensation
committee,49 and prohibition of compensation arrangements that
encourage inappropriate risks50 or could lead to material financial
loss to the financial institution.51
The post-Dodd–Frank Act-reform debate is predominated by
dissension over say-on-pay provisions.52 Critics argue that
shareholder voting on executive compensation could actually hurt
shareholders because it diffuses responsibility regarding
compensation and insulates directors’ reputations.53 With say-onpay provisions in place, directors may be incentivized to authorize
larger compensation packages that are less sensitive to
performance.54 Moreover, shareholders may lack the incentives
and resources to evaluate the information and may not be able to
determine whether executive pay is reasonable.55 Say-on-pay
provisions could give proxy advisory firms more power.56

45. Id. § 953(a)(i).
46. Id. § 953(b).
47. Id. § 955.
48. Id. § 954(b).
49. Id. § 952.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 956(a)(1)(B).
52. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Stephanie M. Greene, “Say on Pay:” The
Movement to Reform Executive Compensation in the United States and European
Union, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 593, 593 (2011) (describing U.S. and European
Union reform efforts in the context of executive compensation); Memorandum
from Michael J. Segal, UK Government Announces Binding Vote on Executive
Compensation (June 21, 2012) (discussing the differences in say-on-pay
provisions in the U.K. and U.S.) (on file with author and with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
53. Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417, 418 (2011).
54. See id. (proposing an opt-out of the say-on-pay regime by shareholder
vote).
55. Tiffany Roddenberry, Say-on-Pay: Cautionary Notes on the Use of Third
Party Compensation Guidelines in the United States, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 933,
933 (2011); see also Gordon, supra note 26, at 325.
56. Gordon, supra note 26, at 325.
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To remedy the shortcomings, some suggest that Congress
give shareholders a right to opt into a binding vote on the board’s
pay scheme,57 while others suggest that shareholders should have
a right to decide whether a public firm should schedule a vote on
executive compensation,58 information disclosed should include
details on the pay of executives at competitor companies,59 and
shareholders should have a right to decide whether a public firm
should schedule a vote on executive compensation.60
Despite its many critics,61 say-on-pay may have led to
improvements. As a result of say-on-pay requirements, some
firms may have reduced compensation and increased
performance measures for executive compensation.62 Because
poorly performing companies with high pay levels can expect
shareholder dissent, say-on-pay may attract strong shareholder
support.63 Shareholders may perceive compensation procedures
as fairer under say-on-pay, which could increase shareholder
confidence in an entity’s board of directors and increased investor
interest in the entity.64
57. Andrew L. Bethune, An Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder
Opt-In as a Solution to the Managerial Power Problem, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 585,
589, 610 (2011).
58. Gordon, supra note 26, at 326 (arguing that this regime would focus
attention on firms with the most questionable practices).
59. Roddenberry, supra note 55, at 934, 952.
60. Gordon, supra note 26, at 326 (arguing that this regime would focus
attention on firms with the most questionable practices, enabling successful
implementation to be observed by similar firms and possibly causing them to
change their behavior).
61. For a summary of criticism on say-on-pay provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Act, see Roddenberry, supra note 55, at 940; Bethune, supra note 57, at
610–14.
62. Steven Balsam & Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive
Compensation 4 (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026121.
63. See id. (“In this paper we find affected firms reduce their compensation,
with that decrease being greater for firms that overpaid their CEOs in prior
periods. We also find evidence that they increased their use of performancebased compensation.”).
64. Kendall Bowlin, Margaret H. Christ & Jeremy B. Griffin, Say-on-Pay
and the Differential Effects of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Regimes on Investor
Perceptions and Behavior (AAA 2011 Mgmt. Acct. Sec. (MAS) Meeting Paper,
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1659862.
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C. The Creditor-Centered Approach
Executive compensation in the United States mostly takes the
form of equity-based instruments. Changes to the tax code and other
regulation encourage equity-based compensation for executives.65
The justification of executive compensation with equity-based
products has been a major focus of theoretical research on executive
compensation in the past three decades.66 However, an increasing
part of the literature is now considering the role of debt for manager
incentives,67 and empirical studies show that risk-taking can decline
if executives hold more debt relative to their equity holdings.68
Bebchuk and Spaman show that a compensation package that
includes a basket of securities representing a predefined percentage
of the aggregate value of all outstanding bonds, preferred shares,
and common shares could help address the shortcomings of existing
executive compensation practices.69 Tying executive compensation
to this basket of securities issued by either the bank holding
company or the bank70 can improve incentives for executives to
65. See, e.g., 26 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006); Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried,
Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1921 (2010);
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, TOP 10 RED FLAGS TO WATCH FOR WHEN
CASTING AN ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE PAY 2–4 (2010), http://www.cii.org/
UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/March%202010%20-%20Say%20
on%20Pay%20Checklist.pdf.
66. See generally Jensen & Murphy, supra note 7 (showing that it is more
important to focus on the form of executive compensation than the amount of
compensation).
67. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1; Tung, supra note 9;
Hill & Painter, supra note 9.
68. See generally Tung & Wang, supra note 8; Wei & Yermack, supra note
8; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1553; see also Gerakos, supra note 8,
at 23 (finding that pension benefits may reduce risk-taking).
69. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 253, 283–84. How the
securities in the basket should be weighted is unclear. Weighting debt
securities, including contingent convertible bonds, heavily in the calibration of
executive compensation may increase the positive effects of debt in executive
compensation packages. At the same time, debt may not be the preferred form of
compensation for executives. Calibrating executive compensation packages to
account for desired incentives and governance improvements while giving
sufficient incentives for executives to perform within expected parameters could
require an institution specific relational approach and a learning process for
institutions. See discussion supra Part IV (reviewing the benefits of the
incomplete contract theory of New Institutional Economics (NIE)).
70. Id.
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consider the losses that risk-taking could impose on shareholders,
bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.71 Regulators could place
constraints on the pay schemes to shape how executives choose the
actions that are allowed by direct regulation.72 Moreover, bonuses
could be based not only on earnings per share, but rather on broader
metrics that also reflect the interests of preferred shareholders,
bondholders, and the government as guarantor of deposits.73 Hill
and Painter suggest mandatory partnership or joint venture
agreements and assessable stock to ensure that bankers have some
personal liability.74 This personal liability could improve creditor
protection because executives would be exposed to some downside
risk and would be disincentivized from taking excessive risks.75
The literature on inside debt similarly emphasizes creditor
protection. Inside debt in the form of deferred compensation and
pension plans, among other instruments, can help optimize
managers’ incentives and serves an important function in the
calibration of executive compensation packages.76 Fred Tung
suggests using public subordinated debt securities for part of the
compensation of bank executives.77 Debt and equity hold different
risk preferences, and creditors’ preferences for more conservative
management strategies can help curb managers’ risk-taking.78
71. Id. at 247, 253, 283–84.
72. Id. at 253.
73. Id.
74. Hill & Painter, supra note 9, at 1174–75.
75. Id.
76. See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1552 (arguing that inside
debt alters managerial incentives). This in turn alters the size of the firm’s
payouts, the composition of these payouts (dividends versus share repurchases),
the firm’s cost of debt and its capital structure, the choice of new securities to be
issued (debt versus equity), project choice, capital expenditure choice, and the
incentive to pursue diversifying mergers, among many other things; and
discussing whether and under what conditions such debt holdings could be part
of an optimal compensation package. Id.
77. Tung, supra note 9.
78. Id. at 1212–13; see also Rosalind L. Bennett, Levent Güntay & Haluk
Unal, Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk and Performance during the Crisis 23–25
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2012-3, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122619 (stating that in
bank holding companies, a CEO’s lower holdings of inside debt relative to equity
had an association with higher default risk and worse performance during the
crisis period).
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Inside debt in the form of defined benefit plans can make executives
sensitive to firm value in bankruptcy, which is desired by
creditors.79 Measured by an entity’s distance from default, aligning
managers’ interests with creditors’ can reduce a firm’s risk of
defaulting80 and improve its credit rating.81 Debt should be part of
executive compensation because it is an efficient deterrent against
risk-shifting.82
79. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey
of New Optimal Contracting Theories, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 486, 493 (2009); see
also Reilly S. White, Inside Debt and Firm Dividend Policy 1, 26 (Working
Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2054787 (“Managers with high pension holdings will be more reluctant to
commit to high dividend policy that can risk their future pension payouts.”).
“These findings provide support to the manager-owner agency theory, where
executive pensions can act as ‘counter options’, and therefore align executive
interests away from shareholders towards bondholders.” Id.
80. Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8.
81. Gerakos, supra note 8, at 11–12.
82. Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 77–78, 91 (2011)
(justifying the use of debt as efficient compensation and arguing that a debt bias
can improve effort as well as deter risk-shifting); see also Riccardo Calcagno &
Luc Renneboog, The Incentive to Give Incentives: On the Relative Seniority of
Debt Claims and Managerial Compensation, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1795, 1795,
1809 (2007) (arguing that the increase in the leverage of Anglo-American
corporations has stimulated the interest in the role of debt as a direct incentive
device for management to generate stronger corporate performance); Tung &
Wang, supra note 8, at 5 (“Our empirical evidence provides a rationale for the
use of inside debt compensation in structuring executive compensation in the
banking context.”); Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 588 (stating that “CEO inside
debt holdings . . . are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm,”
and therefore expose “the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside
creditors,” and arguing that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display
lower levels of risk-seeking behavior); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix
Banks, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 109 (2012) (suggesting paying top executives
with debt instead of equity-based compensation to give them more incentive to
worry about risk); Hernan Ortiz-Molina, Executive Compensation and Capital
Structure: The Effects of Convertible Debt and Straight Debt on CEO Pay, 43 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 69, 71 (2007) (arguing that the hypothesis that debt reduces
manager–shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results); Alex
Edmans, How to Fix Executive Compensation: For Starters, Don’t Link Pay
Packages Just to Stock; Tie Them to Debt as Well, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at
R.1 (advocating for the inclusion of debt in executive compensation packages in
order to reduce risk-taking); Bolton, Mehran & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 34
(presenting evidence that the market believes that “including debtlike
instruments in CEO compensation packages will reduce risk” for financial
institutions); see generally Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy:
Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007)
(proposing a novel bankruptcy compensation plan, otherwise known as debt
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The creditor-centered approach to executive compensation has
encountered some critics who argue that inside debt can be
inefficient and may not influence executives’ conduct sufficiently
while creating complicated incentive structures.83 Other criticisms
include allegations of too strong a focus on the banking sector and
managers’ ability to manipulate book value as the only available
measure of asset value.84 Critics have also attacked the creditorcentered approach on methodological grounds because they assume
that the principal–agent relationship in that approach is a one-shot
transaction rather than a relational contract.85 Given the
shortcomings pointed out by the debate, some call for a paradigm
shift to overcome the unnecessary creation of new remuneration
narratives.86
III. Contingent Capital
Contingent convertible bonds (CCBs) are debt securities that
can either be written down or converted into equity upon a
triggering event.87 The many applications and benefits of contingent
convertible bonds88 include their ability to stabilize and prepare

compensation, that is expected to provide better incentives for CEOs to perform
efficiently).
83. Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, Is Inside Debt Efficient? Theory and
New Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation 49–50 (Bos.
Coll. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 266, 2012), J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038528 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. Sepe, supra note 1, at 210–11.
85. Id. at 193, 211–12.
86. Jaap W. Winter, Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive
Remuneration Built to Fail, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70.
GEBURTSTAG, 1521–35 (Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar & Hanno Merkt eds.,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1792483
(arguing that regulation of performance-based executive compensation will fail
to solve system-wide problems due to inherent flaws in human behavior, and
proposing alternative compensation structures that decrease the significance of
remuneration, focus compensation comparisons internally, and reduce variable
pay while calling for greater shareholder involvement in company operations).
87. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 6.
88. See Kaal, supra note 14 (summarizing the benefits of contingent
convertible bonds).
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SIFIs for future financial crises,89 signal default risk,90 prevent
bailouts,91 decrease risk-taking,92 minimize moral hazard,93
incentivize the increase in capital,94 internalize bank failure
89. See Mark J. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with
Contingent Capital Certificates 21–22 (Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter
Flannery, Stabilizing], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1485689 (pointing out that automatic conversion of contingent
capital debt diminishes probability of future financial loss); Mark J. Flannery,
No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via “Reverse Convertible
Debentures” 24–25 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Flannery,
No Pain], http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/flannery/No%20Pain,%20No%20Gain.
pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (arguing that contingent capital will increase
firms’ financial leverage through automatic loss absorption) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See Raghuram Rajan, More Capital Will Not Stop the Next Crisis, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at 9 (suggesting that contingent convertible bonds should be
used to raise capital “when regulators see a crisis coming”); William C. Dudley,
President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Institute of
International Bankers Membership Luncheon: Some Lessons from the Crisis
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud
091013.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (proposing that contingent capital can
be used to adequately capture risk) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
91. Coffee, supra note 9, at 803–06 (promoting contingent capital as an
alternative to bailouts); Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, An
Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory
Hybrid Securities 2, 4 (Council on Foreign Relations: Ctr. for Geoeconomic
Studies, Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter Squam Lake Working Grp.],
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/economics/expedited-resolution-mechanismdistressed-financial-firms-regulatory-hybrid-securities/p19002 (suggesting that
hybrid securities would help prevent bailouts); Charles W. Calomiris & Richard
J. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement
39 (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1815406 (averring that contingent capital could help prevent the
“too big to fail” problem).
92. Pennacchi et al., supra note 13, at 36; Dudley, supra note 90 (asserting
that because bank difficulties would trigger conversion, the dilution of
shareholders creates an incentive for bank managers to “manage not only for
good outcomes on the upside of the boom, but also against bad outcomes on the
downside”).
93. See Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 15 (“Frequent trigger
evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives and . . . [result in] surprisingly
low default risk.”).
94. See Squam Lake Working Grp., supra note 91, at 3–4 (arguing that
conversion of contingent capital bonds would quickly recapitalize banks);
Calomiris & Herring supra note 91, at 39 (“A proper CoCos requirement can
provide strong incentives for the prompt recapitalization of banks after
significant losses of equity.”).
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cost,95 avoid financial contagion,96 and “limit systemic risk.”97 As a
hybrid instrument, contingent convertible bonds combine the limited
upside of debt in the form of the coupon rate with the unlimited
downside risk of equity, i.e., the total loss of the investment. Several
successful contingent convertible bond issuances in Europe with
coupon rates between 7% and 9.5% show that these securities
can display a combination of features that investors and issuers
find attractive.98 The market in contingent convertible bonds is
slowly evolving.99 Because contingent convertible debt has
many applications and could help reform policy in many areas,
the concept finds increasing support among academics100 and policy
95. Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 12 (calling contingent capital
securities an “alternative to government absorption of private losses”); Robert L.
McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger 2 (Working Paper,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430 (“[Contingent Capital]
reduces the debt load for poorly-performing institutions . . . but permits
individual banks to fail in good times.”).
96. See GOLDMAN SACHS TBTF, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that if the
appropriate triggers are in place, it could prevent bank runs—though if the
trigger is based on market prices, it could worsen bank runs); see also Darrell
Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-Of-Court Restructuring of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions 5 (Hoover Inst., Working Papers on Econ.
Pol’y, 2009), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/
06EndingGovernmentBailoutsAsWeKnowThemDuffie.pdf
(describing
how
conversion of contingent capital debt could “forestall . . . a liquidity crisis”).
97. Kaal, supra note 14, at 105; see also Coffee, supra note 9, at 806
(proposing use of contingent capital securities to reduce “pressure on corporate
managers to accept greater risk and leverage”).
98. Kaal, supra note 14, at 134–36.
99. Id. at 136 (acknowledging a “lack of regulatory guidance”).
100. See id.; DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 84–85 (2011) (noting
that the Dodd–Frank Act instructs the General Accountability Office to conduct
a study on contingent capital and to begin using it when the study is completed);
Coffee, supra note 9, at 839; Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14; Pennacchi et al.,
supra note 13, at 36; Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear of Fire
Sales and the Credit Freeze 28 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No.
305, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/work305.pdf (“[C]ontingent capital is like
installing sprinklers . . . . [W]hen the fire threatens, the sprinklers will turn
on.”); Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 15. But see Christian Koziol &
Jochen Lawrenz, Contingent Convertibles: Solving or Seeding the Next Banking
Crisis?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 90, 91 (2012) (explaining that in situations
involving incomplete contracts, contingent convertible bonds may subject banks
to greater financial distress); Duffie, supra note 96, at 5 (stating that contingent
convertible bonds are “unlikely to stop a [bank’s] liquidity crisis once it begins”);
McDonald, supra note 95, at 20–21 (describing situations where contingent
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makers.101
Contingent convertible triggering events for conversion from
debt into equity are typically intended to avert a financial
weakening of the entity.102 The automatic conversion from debt into
equity helps increase capital when needed and lowers the debt–to–
equity ratio.103 The automatic conversion of debt into equity may
prove especially attractive to SIFIs who could otherwise be forced
into restructuring.104 Because of the importance of the conversion
feature of contingent convertible bonds for purposes of corporate
governance improvements, the analysis in this Article will focus on
capital fails to convert).
101. See COMM’N OF EXPERTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
FOR LIMITING THE ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 59–60 (2010),
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/index.html?lang=en
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (proposing the conversion of contingent capital upon
certain triggering events) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in a Bow to Critics of Fed’s Role, Supports
Forming a Regulatory Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B3 (stating that
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, opined that giant financial
players might be forced to adopt “contingent” capital, and noting that contingent
capital is “gaining popularity within the Fed”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed. Res.
Governor, Speech at the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. to the Federal
Reserve: Confronting Too Big to Fail (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091021a.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2012) (commenting that contingent capital offers “significant promise of
injecting market discipline into the firm”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). For a description of the policy in the European Union, see Press
Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Wants Stronger and More Responsible
Banks in Europe (July 20, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/11/915&type=HTML (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“The proposal
will require banks to hold more and better capital to resist future shocks by
themselves . . . . With its proposal, the Commission translates in Europe
international standards on bank capital agreed at the G20 level (most commonly
known as the Basel III agreement).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
102. Coffee, supra note 9, at 805; Duffie, supra note 96, at 4–5; Flannery,
Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 3.
103. See AMAR BHIDÉ, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT: SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 291 (2010) (offering a proposal aimed at reducing risk-taking
by amending current financial regulations to allow unregulated financial
institutions to raise debt or equity, “but not on a short-term basis from the
public or regulated fiduciaries”); Coffee, supra note 9, at 805 (averring that
contingent capital can counter-leverage debt).
104. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 234 (stating that “conversion of
debt into equity could be an attractive alternative” for struggling financial
institutions); Coffee, supra note 9, at 805 (“By definition, such a conversion [of
contingent capital debt] averts . . . bankruptcy . . . .”).
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contingent convertible bonds with a conversion feature rather than
a write-down.
Contingent convertible bonds have quasi-public good
characteristics105 and are particularly suitable for purposes of
corporate governance improvements in SIFIs.106 The conversion
feature of these securities may have the ability to influence
corporate governance in SIFIs.107 If sufficient volumes of contingent
convertible bond issuances are combined with adequate design
features, the conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds and
the threat of dilution of equity positions in SIFIs could affect
corporate governance in SIFIs.108 Measures to increase the
effectiveness of the conversion feature of contingent capital, such as
increased voting rights or sequential triggers, could further increase
the impact these securities may have on corporate governance.109
In part because of mounting pressure from politicians, policy
makers, and legislators who demanded remedies for corporate
governance shortcomings, European SIFIs have issued contingent
convertible bonds.110 Contingent convertible bonds’ potential to
address corporate governance shortcomings, albeit not fully utilized
in the existing designs, may help with public relations because a
contingent convertible bond issuance may signal to investors,
politicians, and the general public that SIFI management is
instituting safety-increasing measures that can help avoid future
bailouts. Although the designs of recent contingent convertible
bond issuances provide mostly for a write-down feature rather
than a conversion to equity, the SIFIs who issued contingent
convertible bonds seem to have recognized the market acceptance
and investor demand for these hybrid securities. The market in
105. Kaal, supra note 14, at 140.
106. Id. at 140, 146.
107. Id. at 144.
108. Id. at 145.
109. See id. at 144–46 (outlining how contingent capital debt could be
utilized to increase voting rights); Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 255–56
(explaining how sequential triggers could “increase voting rights for holders of
contingent capital”).
110. Kaal, supra note 14, at 125–26 (summarizing Swiss efforts to
implement contingent capital rules and how these efforts precipitated Credit
Suisse’s voluntary issuances of contingent convertible bonds); see also GOLDMAN
SACHS, supra note 12, at 18 (comparing the “few ‘loss absorbing’ securities . . .
issued in the European market”).
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contingent convertible bonds, however, is still in its infancy, and
privately negotiated contingent convertible bond sales have so far
not resulted in efficiently functioning contingent convertible bond
designs that take corporate governance considerations into
account. It is doubtful if market solutions and private ordering
alone will produce contingent capital designs that help improve
corporate governance in SIFIs.
IV. Incomplete Contract Theory
This Article expands the existing literature on the creditorcentered approach to executive compensation by recommending
the inclusion of contingent convertible bonds in the calibration of
executives’ compensation packages. Scholarly contributions in the
context of the creditor-centered approach to executive
compensation are often (implicitly) based on the classical contract
model or the spot contract model.111 This can result in suboptimal
and unrealistic outcomes. The classical contract model assumes a
system of rules that deals with and legally guarantees all future
eventualities. The parties to a contract negotiate and agree ex
ante on all possible scenarios and eventually execute the contract
as agreed. The contract in this model hopes to anticipate all
eventualities and is not intended to be ambiguous.112 The model
assumes that the comprehensive nature of the regulation leaves
no discretion to the agents, making opportunistic behavior
impossible. Transaction costs in the form of initiating, concluding
111. Many scholars who endorse the creditor-centered approach to executive
compensation may implicitly use the classical- or spot-contract model of
executive compensation. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 255–56
(examining banks’ incentive for risk-taking using only two periods: “the present,
when managers make decisions, and the future, when gains or losses are
realized and the manager gets paid” because using multiple periods for the
analysis unnecessarily complicates the analysis without changes in the
conclusions or other substantial benefits); Gordon, supra note 26, at 332–39
(explaining that shareholders now have more corporate governance power to
push for “pay for performance” executive compensation); Hill & Painter, supra
note 9, at 1175, 1186–95; Sepe, supra note 1, at 211–12 (summarizing the
issues).
112. Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 755 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman
eds., 1989).
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and enforcing the contract are not considered in the classical
contract model.
Contrary to the assumptions of the classical contract model
and the spot contract model, executive contracts have an informal
relational dimension that goes beyond the written contract
between the parties. The relationship between the executive as
agent and the corporation and its shareholders as principal
involves more than the contractual terms of the agreement. An
executive compensation contract combines elements of a
knowledge exchange and relational collaboration. Informal
relational behavior between the principal and agent generates
confidence in the relationship, creates institution-specific
knowledge, and provides innovative capabilities. The informal
relational elements of executive compensation contracts can often
overshadow the legal terms of the agreement. Using a model for
the analysis of executive contracts that is based on the single
contract between the executive–agent and corporation–principal
would ignore the informal relational element of this principal–
agent relationship. Given the importance of the informal
relational element of executive compensation contracts, the
literature on the debt-centered approach to executive
compensation should include informal relational-, behavioral-,
and incomplete-contract theories.
These shortcomings in the analysis of executive
compensation contracts under the classical contract model and
spot contract model can be overcome with the relational or
incomplete contract model in New Institutional Economics
(NIE).113 NIE is a relatively young offspring of economic theory 114
and shares core assumptions with the neoclassical model, such as
113. Rudolf Richter, Banking Regulation as Seen by the New Institutional
Economics, in 2 THE ECONOMICS AND LAW OF BANKING REGULATION 136 (Eirik G.
Furubotn & Rudolf Richter eds., 1989).
114. NIE’s assumptions are increasingly used in modern economic analysis
of financial markets and financial rules. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INVESTING 9–10 (2002) (pointing out that studying “behavioral phenomena” is
integral to understanding inefficient markets); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 10 (2000) (stressing that
investors are often irrational, that they “deviate from the standard decision
making model in a number of fundamental areas,” and that they do not behave
as would be expected under traditional theories that rely on efficient markets).
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methodological individualism, scarcity of resources, and selfinterested rational behavior.115 NIE, however, substitutes the
assumption of full rationality with bounded rationality116 and
opportunistic behavior,117 and underscores that information is
systematically incomplete.118 NIE emphasizes the functioning,
development, and improvement of institutions.119 Institutions are
defined as general rules or sets of general rules, together with
their enforcement mechanisms.120 NIE emphasizes the
importance of informal institutions, such as social norms.121
Because corporate governance issues often involve formal and
informal institutions, NIE is ideally suited to examine the
efficiency
of
governance
structures.
Experimentation,
observation, and rule revision in NIE’s model are part of a
115. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3–5, 7 (2d ed.
2005).
116. See STEFAN VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK [INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS]
22–23 (2d ed. 2009).
117. Id. at 88–89; FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 5.
118. See VOIGT, supra note 116, at 237–38.
119. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 35–37 (describing the
subfields of modern NIE research); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (outlining the
author’s belief that studying institutional change is essential to understanding
economic theory and “the way societies evolve through time”); RUDOLF RICHTER
& EIRIK G. FURUBOTN, NEUE INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK 1 [NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS] (3d ed. 2003); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 16 (1985) (“The changing character of economic organization over
time . . . is of particular interest to [transaction cost economics and NIE].”);
VOIGT, supra note 116; Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New Institutional
Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation Potentials, in
PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 25–26, 32 (Pio Baake & Rainald
Borck eds., 2007) (explaining that NIE examines how institutional changes and
transaction costs affect behavior, and calling institutions the “core elements of
the functions of markets”); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72–74 (1998) (describing how NIE examines transaction
costs and their effect on institutional behavior and improvements); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979) (“The new institutional economics is
preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs.”).
120. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 7 (“[A]n institution will be
defined as a set of formal and informal rules, including their enforcement
arrangements.”); VOIGT, supra note 116.
121. See VOIGT, supra note 116 (recognizing that limiting the analysis to a
subset of formal institutions would ignore important problems).
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continuous process that avoids “optimal” or “stable” rules.122
Experimentation can result in a learning process that can
improve the quality of governance structures. Because it is likely
that underlying economic conditions will change, contingent
convertible bond offerings to the public and to executives may
benefit from a process of experimentation and learning.
In contrast to classical contract analysis, NIE’s incomplete
contract model recognizes that contracts are inevitably
incomplete and rely on control rights to minimize opportunistic
behavior.123 This model takes opportunistic behavior and
transaction costs into account.124 The degree of contractual
incompleteness is influenced by the cost of contracting and
contracting parties’ ability to anticipate opportunistic behavior.125
The theory of incomplete contracts under NIE can be considered
part of the principal–agent approach because information before
and after contracting is asymmetric and the agent has a certain
amount of discretion making opportunistic behavior possible.126
At the core of the principal–agent relationship in executive
compensation is the short-term interest of the manager/agent to
generate a high income that conflicts with the long-term
ownership interest of the shareholders/principals. The relational
elements in executive compensation contracts may further
increase the principal–agent problem. The combination of
knowledge exchange and relational collaboration in executive
compensation contracts makes opportunistic behavior of
executives likely.127 Contracting parties are, however, limited in
122. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 137–39 (explaining the benefits of
experimentation for the evolution of contingent capital rules).
123. WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 32; Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Coase,
Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1247, 1247 n.2 (2012); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative
Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 269, 294 (1991) (expanding the analysis to governance
mechanisms in relation to transaction costs).
124. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 30 (defining opportunism as “selfinterest seeking with guile”); see also FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115.
125. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 24–25
(1995).
126. See generally FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115.
127. Short-termism to maximize personal income through stock options, the
Fuld Problem (see infra Part VI.B), and income inequality between senior
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their ability to anticipate opportunistic behavior of agents.
Therefore, control rights to limit opportunistic behavior become
increasingly important. Because of incomplete information,
information asymmetries in the principal–agent relationship,
bounded rationality of contracting parties, the parties’ limited
cognition and foresight, and transaction costs, control rights in
executive compensation contracts cannot account sufficiently for
ex post opportunism of agents. Adding contingent convertible
bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages
can create a corporate governance mechanism that helps address
these shortcomings.128
Non-contractual behavior in the form of non-contractual
norms, reciprocity, trust, friendship, reputation, altruism,
interdependence, and moral obligations may be unenforceable
through contractual agreements, but it can shape economic
action.129 Non-contractual behaviors can harmonize conflicts and

executives and the rest of the workforce are only a few examples of opportunistic
behavior of agents in the context of executive compensation.
128. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the design of early triggers in executive
compensation).
129. See JEFFERY PFEFFER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH PEOPLE 95
(1994) (stating that executives are incentivized by social approval); Siegwart
Lindenberg, The Cognitive Side Governance, 20 RES. SOC. ORGS. 47, 47 (2003);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63–64 (1963) (stating that business behavior is
guided in part by its effect on reputation); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 731–33 (1974) (describing how contracts are
typically coupled with non-contractual, non-economic motivations); Richard H.
McAdams, Cultural Contingency and Economic Function: Bridge-Building from
the Law & Economics Side, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 221, 222–23 (2004) (explaining
that market practices are perpetuated both through contingent and noncontingent practicalities); Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law
Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 636 (2001) (stating that
norms are informally enforced by third-party sanctions such as ostracism);
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 339 (1997) (describing how norms shape individual behavior
that is not directly addressed by law). For a number of studies related to noncontractual behaviors, see D. Eleanor Westney, Organisational Evolution of the
Multinational Enterprise: An Organisational Sociology Perspective, 29 MGMT.
INT’L REV. 56 (1999); Laszlo Bruszt & David Stark, Who Counts?: Supranational
Norms and Societal Needs, 17 E. EUR. POLITICS & SOCIETIES 74 (2003); Walter
Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295 (1990) (noting that non-contractual behaviors such
as altruism, reputation, and friendship can replace ineffectual legal contracts).
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help sustain relationships.130 Therefore, non-contractual behavior
should be considered in the attempt to optimize manager
incentives for corporate governance improvements.
V. Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation
The academic literature on executive compensation is largely
silent on the use of contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation. Similarly, the literature on contingent capital has
mostly ignored the possible application of contingent convertible
bonds in executive compensation.131 The governance-improving
features of contingent convertible bonds132 can be applied to
executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds in
executive compensation can help address the core executive
compensation issues that emerged after the global Financial
Crisis.133 More specifically, contingent convertible bonds in
executive compensation packages can improve suboptimal
incentives for risk-taking by executives, the alignment of
executives’ interests with those of different constituents,
sustainability, and income inequality. This Article proposes the
use of contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in
executive compensation packages.

130. Powell, supra note 129, at 303.
131. Barclays’s issuance of contingent convertible bonds to its executives
precipitated some recognition of CCBs’ possible benefits. Hilscher and Raviv, for
instance, recognize that the effects of contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation depend on the terms of the CCB. See Jens Hilscher & Alon Raviv,
Bank Stability and Market Discipline: The Effect of Contingent Capital on Risk
Taking and Default Probability 24 (Int’l Bus. Sch., Brandeis Univ., Working
Paper, 2011), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/global/pdfs/news/Hilscher
RavivPaper (showing that compensation with contingent convertible bonds can
minimize risk-taking by managers).
132. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 295–96.
133. See Hill, supra note 22, at 24–31 (summarizing the core themes in
recent proposals concerning executive compensation, including income
inequality, incentive optimization, interest alignment, and sustainability).
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A. Precedent Barclays
The proposal in this Article to use contingent capital bonds
with early triggers in executive compensation is not a mere
theoretical construct. European SIFIs have started to add
contingent convertible bonds to executive compensation packages.
The English bank Barclays has issued contingent capital
securities to its executives as deferred incentive awards.134 The
contingent convertible bonds issued under Barclays’s Contingent
Capital Plan (CCP), however, would not be written down or
converted into equity like other CCBs. Under Barclays’s CCP, its
“synthetic CoCos” simply lapse when the capital ratio falls below
7%.135 More specifically, if Barclays’s Group Core Tier 1 capital
ratio falls below the threshold, the executives will receive no
coupon payment and the Contingent Capital Award (CCA) will
134. See Rob Cox, At Barclays, a Pay System That May Please, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2010, at B2 (“CoCos would not merely constitute a compensation fig leaf.
Throwing the securities into bankers’ stockings better aligns their interests with
those of regulators hoping to avoid a repeat of the taxpayer bailouts of the last
financial crisis.”); BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 167 (“[D]eferred
incentive awards for 2010 are made under the Share Value Plan (SVP) in the
form of Barclays shares and under the Contingent Capital Plan (CCP) in the
form of contingent capital awards.”).
135. E-mail from Mark Lane, Dir. of Corporate Commc’ns, Barclays Capital,
to Wulf Kaal, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Dec. 14,
2011, 3:52 PM CST) (on file with author and with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Jill Treanor, City Resists Barclays Chiefs’ ‘CoCo’ Bonuses:
Bank Plans New Bonds to Boost Top Executives’ Pay, GUARDIAN Mar. 19, 2011,
at 50 (“The cocos Barclays intends to use to pay its staff do not convert into
equity, however, but merely fall away once the bank’s capital ratio falls below
7%.”); Tommy Wilkes & Sinead Cruise, Barclays Heads for Investor Clash over
Pay, REUTERS Apr. 26, 2011, http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancial
ServicesAndRealEstateNews/idINLDE73K0DP20110426?irpc=984 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jill Treanor,
Barclays Faces Shareholder Anger over Bob Diamond’s Pay, GUARDIAN Apr. 20,
2011, at 28 (“Cocos are a new type of financial instrument that can convert into
equity during times of severe stress and have been issued by a handful of banks
to raise fresh capital from investors.”) “Barclays, though, intends to issue the
cocos only to its staff. The Barclays cocos will not convert into equity but merely
fall away once the bank’s capital ratio falls below 7%—which is why they are
being called synthetic cocos.” Id.; see also Editorial, Bankers and Their Bonuses,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at WK.7 (“Cocos are long-term bonds that convert into
equity if the bank hits a crisis. The idea is that paying bankers in bonds
encourages them to keep the business solvent. This is even more so if a crisis
triggers their conversion into shares that would become worthless in
bankruptcy.”); BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 182.
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remain unvested.136 However, the unvested portion of the CCA
can be released and paid out to the executives if after six months
the Group Core Tier 1 capital ratio has recovered.137 In order to
take into account the possible effect of any actions taken to
address the shortfall in the capital ratio on shareholders, the
release may be adjusted. No coupon will be awarded if there was
a downward adjustment.138 Should the Group Core Tier 1 capital
ratio not recover to above 7% five years after the suspension of
the CCA, the CCA will lapse.139
Barclays’s contingent capital award to executives without a
triggering event into equity and a mere lapse is beneficial
because it underscores the possible use of contingent convertible
bonds in executive compensation. Given European proposals on
the use of contingent convertible bonds to make SIFIs safer and
avoid bailouts,140 Barclays’s contingent convertible bond issuance
to executives may also signal its willingness to consider the
136. BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 182.
137. Id.; see also Barclays, Barclays PLC Notice of Annual General Meeting
2011, at 12 (Mar. 10, 2011), http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/pdfs/barcar
10_notice.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Council Directives
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC,
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2001/35/EC and Regulation
(EU) No. 1093/2010, COM (2012) 280/3, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/bank/docs/crisis-management/2012_eu_framework/COM_2012_280_en.
pdf; Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, Brussels Looks to Bank Investors Not
Taxpayers, FT.COM, June 6, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f94b6432-afeb11e1-ad0b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xDA7jik4 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“The
Reform blueprint gives national Regulators summary power to write down
unsecured creditors in failing banks and establish a network of national funds
to cover resolution costs . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Gareth Murphy, Mark Walsh & Matthew Willison, Precautionary
Contingent Capital 6 (Bank of Eng. Fin. Stability Paper No. 16, 2012), http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs_paper16.pdf (“[R]eplacing
debt with contingent capital could encourage risk-shifting behaviour.”); George
M. von Furstenberg, Contingent Capital to Strengthen the Private Safety Net for
Financial Institutions: Cocos to the Rescue? 10 (Deutsche Bundesbank
Discussion Paper No. 01/2011, 2011), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
44598/1/647226642.pdf (“This is the same year in which LBG later managed to
launch a greatly oversubscribed cocos issue of ‘Enhanced Capital Notes’ (ECNs),
for almost £9 billion (worth $15 billion).”).
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possible uses of contingent convertible bonds to prepare the entity
for future crises and systemic shocks. As the first mover in this
context, it is also understandable that Barclays has decided to
avoid the possible governance shakeup that could be associated
with a contingent convertible bond issuance that provides a
conversion feature.
Barclays’s issuance is commendable. Its CCA, as a deferred
compensation award, is inside debt. Unlike inside debt in the
form of traditional bonds, however, it does not create a fixed
claim for managers with a stake in the firm’s liquidation value
because it falls away when converted.141 Barclays’s CCA,
therefore, also does not lower agency cost. Without a stake in the
liquidation value of the SIFI, executives may also not limit their
risk-taking. Barclays’s executives’ interests are aligned with their
debt-holders’ because executives are now also debt-holders, albeit
in a separate class with substantially higher coupon payments.
However, because the CCA falls away upon conversion, the
executives’ interests are still predominantly aligned with
shareholders’ through equity-based compensation, not through
contingent convertible bond holdings.142
Barclays’s issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a
conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance
improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides
only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking. In
its current form, the CCA seems to be a mere compensation
supplement for executives.

141. Contrast this outcome with the proposal in this Article to use
contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in executive compensation. See
infra Part V.B.2 (showing that contingent convertible bonds with early triggers
can lower agency costs more than traditional inside debt, provide greater
incentives to lower risk-taking, align executives’ interests with the interests of
both debt-holders and shareholders, and lower income inequality).
142. See infra Part V.B.2 (explaining how contingent convertible bonds in
executive compensation align the interests of executives with debt-holders’
interests before conversion while increasing incentives for sustainability and
lowering risk-taking and income inequality). Conversely, upon conversion into
equity, CCBs align executives’ interests with the interests of equity-holders
when it is most needed and beneficial for the SIFI, that is, early before the
entity becomes insolvent. Id.
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B. Design of Contingent Convertible Bonds in Executive
Compensation

Contingent convertible bonds issued to investors can have
corporate governance implications as a result of the conversion
feature and the threat of equity dilution following a conversion.143
Issuing contingent convertible bonds to executives as part of their
compensation can have different governance implications.
Perhaps most important for this Article is contingent capital’s
ability to generate powerful incentives for SIFI managers and
thereby lower their risk-taking.144 This applies to contingent
convertible bond issuances to investors145 but also, and more
importantly, to the issuance of contingent capital to executives as
part of their compensation.
Designing contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation to be similar to contingent convertible bonds issued
to investors could result in suboptimal outcomes. Unlike
contingent convertible bonds issued to investors, contingent
convertible bonds may be issued to executives in volumes that
may not suffice to dilute investors’ equity holdings. The lower
volume of contingent convertible bonds issued to executives may
not provide a sufficiently strong equity infusion during a crisis.
Without a design adjustment, contingent convertible bonds held
by executives may not play a significant role in preparing SIFIs
for future financial crises. Contingent convertible bonds in
executive compensation should not be treated like other
contingent capital securities. The design adjustment proposed in
this Article helps to optimize the effectiveness of contingent
convertible bonds in executive compensation and can improve
corporate governance.

143. See Kaal, supra note 14.
144. Id.; Coffee, supra note 9, at 806; see also Dudley, supra note 90 (“If the
bank encounters difficulties triggering conversion, shareholders would be
automatically and immediately diluted. This would create strong incentives for
bank managements to manage not only for good outcomes on the upside of the
boom, but also against bad outcomes on the downside.”).
145. See Kaal, supra note 14.
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1. Automatic Institution-Specific “Early” Trigger
The literature on contingent capital trigger designs focuses
on the efficient calibration of triggering events.146 The efficient
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of
contingent capital because the trigger affects if and when the
conversion takes place. The timing of conversion is crucial for
possible corporate governance improvements.
The early trigger for contingent convertible bonds held by
executives serves a different purpose than the trigger for
contingent convertible bonds held by investors. The early trigger
converts only the portion of executives’ debt to equity, before
investors’ contingent convertible bonds are converted, when the
entity is still sound on a micro-prudential basis. The purpose of
an “early” or “strong” trigger design for CCBs held by executives
is to establish an early warning system147 that is independent of
146. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 806 (stating that contingent capital
can help prevent the risk of the first step in a financial crisis); McDonald, supra
note 95, at 2 (arguing for a conversion triggered by market prices); Pennacchi et
al., supra note 13, at 7 (stating that CoCos can be effective if they are designed
to convert prior to severe financial stress); Squam Lake Working Grp., supra
note 91, at 4 (arguing for a long-term debt instrument that would convert to
equity before a crisis); Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, On the Design of
Contingent Capital with Market Trigger 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep.
No. 448, Nov. 2011), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr448.pdf
(explaining that a market trigger for conversion can provide stability to banks
and markets); see also Duffie, supra note 96, at 5 (arguing that the trigger needs
to be set so as to eliminate debt claims before a liquidity crisis); Flannery,
Stabilizing, supra note 89; Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 1 (introducing
“reverse convertible debentures” that would convert if the issuing firm’s capital
level fell below a prespecified level); Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri,
Contingent Capital with a Capital-Ratio Trigger 2–3 (Working Paper, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669686 (examining conversion based on a
capital-ratio trigger); Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic
Rationale and Design Features 18 (IMF Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/11/01,
2011), http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf (arguing that
contingent capital instruments should be considered part of a crisis prevention
and management framework); GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that
contingent capital is designed to operate before resolution mechanisms become
involved); SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE ET AL., SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG
INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT “TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A
POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION” 43
(2011) [hereinafter SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE], http://www.riksbank.se/
Upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Remisser/2011/Consultation_03031
1.pdf (arguing that bail-in tools may be used to minimize systemic risk).
147. The early warning nature of the early trigger design and the fact that
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the capitalization needs of the entity148 and to provide corporate
governance improvements. To ensure that the early warning
objective of the early trigger is accomplished, it is important to
distinguish between the two general categories of triggers
discussed in the literature: (i) regulatory triggers and
(ii) transactional and automatic triggers.149
Regulatory triggers give regulators the authority to decide
when to convert the contingent convertible bonds. The regulatory
trigger may depend on a regulator’s determination that the
respective bank is not viable without a public sector injection of
capital or a write-off.150 It can also be based on the evaluation of a
bank during a stress test conducted by regulators.151 Regulatory
triggers may lead to market uncertainty and ad hoc decisions by
regulators and result in adverse market responses. Because
regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty,152
they may not be the best option for the design of contingent
convertible bonds in executive compensation. Regulatory
discretion in triggering the conversion could create unfavorable
market movements against the entity. While a regulator may
decide to trigger executives’ CCBs as an early warning sign in a
pending crisis, the cost of supervision could be prohibitive and
regulatory discretion could alienate managers. Similarly, even
though a regulatory trigger could help avoid abuse by

only the executives’ portion of CCBs gets converted to equity could make it
easier for the SIFI to negotiate bridge loans because the entity is still sound on a
micro-prudential basis. If investors’ CCBs get triggered, some lenders may be
unwilling to provide bridge loans. In effect, the early trigger could help avoid
lenders turning away from the company when a large portion of its debt is
converted into equity.
148. The benefit of providing additional capital when needed derives
predominantly from the conversion of contingent convertible bonds issued to
investors, not the portion of contingent convertible bonds issued to executives.
149. See Christoph K. Henkel & Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in
European Union Bank Restructuring, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 191, 256–57
(2012) (comparing dual triggers and sequential triggers).
150. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 8 (describing the attributes of a
conversion trigger based on regulatory discretion).
151. Id.
152. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 255 (“[A regulatory systemic
trigger] can be a trigger that converts CCS into equity upon, for instance, a
regulator’s decision that additional capital is needed.”).
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executives,153 regulatory triggers may insufficiently incentivize
executives to lower risk because the executives would not have to
self-monitor and adjust their risk-taking preferences to avoid the
trigger.
Transactional triggers, which are also called institutionspecific triggers, are privately negotiated terms for triggering
events in bond contracts. They have the advantage of being
flexible and tailored to the parties’ subjective needs.154 Automatic
triggers are mostly privately negotiated terms in bond contracts
that convert debt into equity when a certain capital ratio, stock
price, CDS spread, index value, or other trigger is reached.155
Because institution-specific automatic triggers are flexible and
independent from regulatory discretion, they constitute a good
option for early trigger designs. However, market-based
measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and
banking runs.156 Accounting-based measures in institutionspecific automatic triggers are arguably too infrequently updated
to respond adequately in a financial crisis.
Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation could yield particular benefits if they convert to
equity before the contingent convertible bonds that were issued to
investors.157 Early triggers could be based on various
combinations of design features158 including perhaps already153. See infra Part V.C (discussing design features to avoid abuse of CCBs).
154. Id.; see also SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 146 (favoring a
contractual trigger and arguing that a contractual trigger should come before a
statutory trigger).
155. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 831 (listing potential conversion triggers);
Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 11–12 (same); Flannery, No Pain, supra
note 89, at 15 (“Frequent trigger evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives
and expose the RCD to surprisingly low default risk.”); Glasserman & Nouri,
supra note 146, at 2 (examining contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger);
McDonald, supra note 95, at 2 (proposing contingent capital that “converts to
equity when the bank’s own stock price falls sufficiently, and then only if a
broad financial stock index is also below a trigger value”).
156. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 841 (addressing concerns of market
manipulation); Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 18–20 (same); Flannery,
No Pain, supra note 89, at 20 (acknowledging the possibility of manipulation);
McDonald, supra note 95 , at 3 (same); Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 145, at
3 (“[M]arket values could potentially be manipulated to trigger conversion.”).
157. See infra Part V.B.2.
158. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 251–54 (suggesting a sequential
trigger design with a first trigger that converts CCBs into equity when the SIFI
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existing designs of previously issued contingent convertible bonds
to investors. An entity that has issued contingent convertible
bonds to investors could simply lower the executives’ trigger
threshold in contrast with that of the CCBs that were issued to
investors.159 In the case of automatic institution-specific triggers,
lowering the trigger could be accomplished by adjusting the
capital ratio, stock price, CDS spread, index value, or other
triggering event for the executives’ CCBs to cause the conversion
at an earlier point during the financial weakening of the
respective entity.160
In the case of contingent convertible bonds with a capitalratio trigger,161 an “early” trigger for executives’ contingent
convertible bonds could mean a 10% capital ratio whereas the
“late” trigger for the contingent convertible bonds of investors
could be around 8%.162 Regulatory capital requirements and
industry standards for SIFIs or other banks that are categorized
is still sound but encounters early signs of financial weakening, and a second
trigger that increases the voting rights of CCBs holders after conversion if the
SIFI does not recover). If contingent convertible bonds are issued to executives
as part of a contingent convertible bond issuance with a sequential trigger
design, the design should be adjusted to avoid potential abuse by executives.
Executives may use the early trigger to obtain cheap stock in a crisis.
Executives’ portion of the contingent convertible bond issuance should include a
mandatory holding period of at least five years after conversion. Because
executives’ interests could be adverse to those of CCBs investors, executives’
portion of the CCBs issuance should not include a voting rights increase.
159. Problems with trigger mechanisms have been discussed at length in the
literature. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 821, 827–29 (arguing that
accounting-based measures may be too infrequently updated to respond
effectively in a financial crisis, while regulatory triggers can lead to ad hoc
decisions by regulators that result in market uncertainty and adverse market
responses); McDonald, supra note 95, at 9–12, 22 (describing how market-based
measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs).
160. Although it may be difficult to calibrate the trigger to provide for a
specific time period before the conversion of investors’ CCBs, the early trigger
should give sufficient warning of the weakening financial condition of the entity.
161. The capital ratio of an entity is the percentage of the entity’s capital to
its risk-weighted assets. See Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 146, at 1–4
(discussing contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger and partial and
ongoing conversion).
162. This is just a numerical example that does not take other factors into
account. The purpose of this Article is not to suggest specific design features for
“early” triggers. Rather, the purpose here is to show that the nature of
ownership can have an impact on trigger designs and their potential to improve
corporate governance.
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as “well-capitalized” may change over time.163 To be effective,
early triggers should be well above the threshold for capital
requirements under Basel III.164 But early triggers in the form of
capital ratios should be independent of regulatory demands
pertaining to capitalization levels.
2. The Benefits of “Early” Triggers
Automatic institution-specific early triggers for contingent
convertible bonds issued to executives may increase the overall
effectiveness of these bonds and improve executive compensation
policies.165 The benefits of early triggers may partially depend on
whether the entity issues contingent convertible debt only to
executives or to executives and investors.166 The early trigger for
the portion of contingent convertible bonds held by executives can
be an early warning system and buffer for contingent convertible
bond investors and shareholders.167 Early triggers in contingent
convertible bonds issued to executives provide several
advantages: they lower risk-taking by executives and increase
shareholder monitoring. They also offer a better signal for default
163. The recognition of contingent capital as Tier I Capital and the capital
adequacy standards under Basel III may also influence the adequacy of an early
trigger for contingent convertible bonds held by executives. See Kaal & Henkel,
supra note 14, at 240 (examining the recognition of contingent capital as Tier I
Capital).
164. Under Basel III, banks will have to hold better quality capital. Banks
will have to hold minimum capital representing 8% of risk-weighted assets
(RWA) as well as an additional capital buffer of 2.5% of RWA. 7% of RWA must
be comprised of Tier 1 common equity. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1, 64 (2010), http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
165. See supra Part V.
166. Issuing contingent convertible bonds with the same design features to
both investors and executives creates a risk of management opportunism if
managers are heavily involved in the drafting process. Management
opportunism can lead to socially suboptimal designs. See infra Part V.C
(elaborating on design features to prevent abuse).
167. Investors would be able to anticipate a possible conversion of their
CCBs if the early trigger resulted in a conversion of executives’ CCBs. The
warning and signaling function of the early trigger would benefit CCBs
investors and shareholders of the entity, which may be diluted if the investors’
CCBs are converted to equity.
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risk and align executives’ interests with a more diverse group of
constituents.168
Studies have shown that executives who hold more debt
relative to their equity holdings take fewer risks when managing
an entity.169 Increasing the debt portion of executive
168. These benefits could help make contingent convertible bonds generally
more marketable. In the United States, where the tax treatment of these hybrid
securities is still unclear, many investors still perceive contingent convertible
bonds as a hybrid instrument with few attractive features despite a substantial
coupon rate. See Satyajit Das, Investors Must Hope ‘Cocos’ Never Show Their
Dark Side, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at 22 (“For investors, hybrids are a deeply
subordinated investment with uncertain income and significant capital risk.”);
cf. Liam Vaughan, Investors May Shun Banks’ Contingent Convertibles as
Regulator Adds Limits, BLOOMBERG Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-12-13/investors-may-shun-coco-bonds-approved-by-european-reg
ulators.html (discussing negative investor reactions to contingent convertible
bonds issued by European banks). The early trigger design of CCBs issued to
executives could help signal the entity’s intent to address default risk and
systemic risk, to lower risk incentives, to align executives’ interests with
creditor interests, and to increase monitoring and other corporate governance
improvements. This could generate increased investor interest and help create a
market for contingent convertible bonds in the United States.
169. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 77–78 (explaining how debt
compensation aligns managers’ incentives with the interests of the firm’s
creditors and emphasizing the importance of a balanced mix of equity and debt
in compensation); Gerakos, supra note 8, at 11–12 (finding that pension benefits
may reduce risk-taking); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 1 (“Theory predicts and
empirical evidence supports the claim that as the proportion of CEO wealth held
in the form of debt increases relative to CEO equity holdings, risk taking
declines . . . .”); Wei & Yermack, supra note 8, at 3–5 (discussing the effect of
debt compensation on volatility). Other studies reject the idea that corporate
governance and executive compensation are correlated. See Core, Guay &
Larcker, supra note 19, at 28 (“[A] number of scholars and practitioners either
implicitly or explicitly take the view that contracting arrangements are largely
inefficient and do not reduce agency costs.”); Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J.
Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON.
207, 222 (2001) (finding no relationship between institutional ownership and the
repricing decision); Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing
the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 268–69 (2004) (describing the Managerial
Power Hypothesis and the correlation between executive compensation and
performance); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure
of Executive Compensation 16–17, 38 (Working Paper, 1997), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=41780 (examining the effect
of shareholder proposals on performance); see also Ronald C. Anderson & John
M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the
Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay, 27 J. BANKING & FIN.
1323, 1324–26 (2003) (discussing the role of compensation committees in
determining executive pay); Kam-Ming Wan, Independent Directors, Executive
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compensation packages with contingent convertible bonds can
help lower managers’ risk incentives.170 This effect could be even
more pronounced depending on the proportion of CCBs included
in the total compensation of executives. However, path
dependencies in the executive compensation culture in the United
States will likely make it difficult for executive compensation
policies to move entirely to contingent convertible bonds or other
debt instruments. It is more likely that compensation committees
will continue to combine debt instruments with equity-based
compensation.
The conversion of contingent convertible bonds from debt to
equity, if triggered, would mean that executives hold a highly
discounted equity interest in the entity.171 This may in turn
depress the stock price of the respective entity.172 A negative
effect on the stock price of the entity may lower the value of the

Pay, and Firm Performance 23 (Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=392595 (“[There is] no
systematic evidence that board composition affects change in CEO
compensation.”).
170. Calcagno & Renneboog, supra note 82, at 1796 (“[I]ncrease in the
leverage of Anglo-American corporations has also stimulated the interest in the
role of debt as a direct incentive device . . . including risky debt in the capital
structure changes the ‘incentive to give incentives . . . .’”); Edmans & Liu, supra
note 82, at 77–78 (justifying the use of debt as efficient compensation and
arguing that a debt bias can improve effort as well as deter risk-shifting);
Krawcheck, supra note 82, at 108–09 (suggesting that CEOs with large inside
debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior); Listokin, supra
note 82 (proposing debt compensation as an incentive for managers during
bankruptcy); Ortiz-Molina, supra note 82, at 70 (“[T]he agency costs of debt can
also be reduced by using convertible debt . . . .”); Edmans, supra note 82, at R1
(suggesting debt compensation as a means to reduce risk); Bolton, Mehran &
Shapiro, supra note 19, at 2 (“[M]arket participants do indeed believe that
linking executive compensation to default risk will reduce the riskiness of the
firm.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 5 (“[Our] empirical evidence provides a
rationale for the use of inside debt compensation in structuring executive
compensation in the banking context.”).
171. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for
abuse).
172. Depending on financial institutions’ implementation of contingent
convertible bonds and the evolution of the market in CCBs, the potential effect
of CCBs conversion on stock prices may be evaluated in future research. See
Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 146, at 25 (suggesting that under their design
of contingent capital, where the state-contingent conversion ratio prevents value
transfer, the prices would be kept “‘smooth’ at conversion”).
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equity portion of executives’ compensation packages.173 The
conversion thus not only affects the debt portion of executives’
compensation but also the equity portion after the contingent
convertible bonds portion is converted and when equity is
increasingly important to maintain the overall value of executive
compensation.174 The combined effect could be a strong incentive
for executives to take lower risks in order to avoid the triggering
event.175 The implicit reduction in agency costs176 may be difficult
to measure without actual implementation. The early conversion
feature does not only create incentives for managers to lower
their risk-taking; indeed, the implicit threat of financial loss for
all contingent convertible bond investors, in combination with the
threat of dilution to existing shareholders, could create overall
increased pressure on managers to avoid the conversion of any
portion of CCB, including the conversion of investors’ CCBs.
The issuance of contingent convertible bonds with early
triggers to executives may motivate shareholders, CCBs
173. This effect would be multiplied if the design of early CCBs triggers also
prohibited the exercise of stock options in anticipation of the early trigger and
after the triggering event. It could be technically difficult to delineate what “in
anticipation of the early trigger” means. Defining a suitable time period for the
prohibition before the early trigger could be equally difficult.
174. There is a risk that opportunism may lead managers to increase the
risk profile of the entity after conversion to regain the lost equity value in their
portfolio. However, such action is not likely to occur because an increase in the
risk profile would affect the ability of the entity to obtain other forms of
financing such as bridge loans. The increase in the risk profile after conversion
is also improbable because the early conversion would likely increase
monitoring by CCBs investors and shareholders. Boards may decide to let
managers go upon the occurrence of an early trigger.
175. Managing to avoid the triggering event alone may be possible by
ignoring the other interests of various constituents. However, this Article does
not attempt to provide a holistic approach to corporate governance reform in
SIFIs.
176. For purposes of this Article, “agency cost” is defined as the cost for the
corporation as principal to supervise its executives as agents and protect
investors and other constituents against agents’ opportunism. Executive
compensation agreements can be seen as attempts to reduce agency costs. See
Jensen & Murphy, supra note 7, at 138, 139–40 (explaining that executive
compensation agreements and compensation awards are mostly attempts by the
principal to minimize agency costs, i.e., minimize their agents’ opportunism and
tendency to be risk averse, to invest in suboptimal or idiosyncratic projects, to
shirk, etc.); cf. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 65, at 1917–18 (discussing the
manner in which some forms of compensation agreements increase agency costs
by incentivizing risk-taking and explaining how this can be fixed).
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investors, and other creditors to increase their monitoring.
Because of an implicit expectation that the government will
provide bailout funding due to the nature of the entity, ordinary
SIFI creditors may have suboptimal incentives to monitor the
performance of management.177 These incentives may change if a
SIFI issues contingent capital securities with a conversion
feature for investors and with an early conversion feature for its
executives.178 Should the conversion of executives’ contingent
convertible bonds occur, investors’ CCBs would likely be next in
line for conversion.179 In effect, the conversion of the contingent
convertible bonds issued to executives provides early notice to
177. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 266–67 (describing how,
unlike many other corporations, SIFIs are subject to a high probability of
default and high leverage); see also Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation,
Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
225, 277 (2011); David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord:
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35, 38
(2000) (explaining how deposit insurance helps make debt cheaper than equity);
Julian Jeffrey Gordon & Colin Mayer, The Micro, Macro and International
Design of Financial Regulation 7 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
422, 2012) (“[G]overnment securities are far less secure than was previously
thought and in the process of seeking to rescue financial institutions,
governments may undermine the security of the assets that they have required
their banks to hold.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation
to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 741–43 (2010)
(describing the moral hazard created by government insurance); T.S. Chow &
Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It? 3 (IMF Working
Paper
No.
11/236,
2011),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/events/ccbs_workshop2012/paper_SurtiChow.PDF;
Arthur
E.
Wilmarth Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the TooBig-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial
Conglomerates 4 (GWU Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 2012-40, 2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2050544
(describing the moral hazard created by government insurance).
178. Once a SIFI has issued contingent convertible bonds with conversion
features, creditors are likely to be aware of the triggering events in the
executives’ portion of CCBs because the triggers become public information. If a
SIFI issues CCBs, its intent is likely to avoid future bailouts. Creditors would be
aware of the SIFI’s intent and the measures taken to avoid a bailout and may be
less likely to rely on future bailouts.
179. The proximity of conversion of executives’ CCBs and investors’ CCBs
will depend on the trigger design. If the entity uses an institution-specific early
automatic trigger based on a capital ratio for executives’ CCBs and a similar
trigger with a less aggressive triggering threshold for investors’ CCBs, the
proximity of conversion would depend on the difference in capital ratio in the
respective trigger designs of executives’ CCBs and investors’ CCBs.
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investors that their CCBs may also convert into equity unless
they address the underlying issues. Accordingly, managers would
likely be subjected to increased scrutiny by investors who fear the
conversion of their contingent convertible bonds into nearworthless equity. Shareholders who fear the loss of their entire
investment should the entity go into bankruptcy may also put
managers under increased pressure to lower their risk-taking.180
The impending threat of dilution for existing shareholders due to
the possible conversion of the contingent convertible bonds held
by investors may motivate existing shareholders to get actively
involved in the governance of the entity.181 Shareholder voting on
management proposals to address perceived concerns could
increase. The implicit threat of financial loss for all contingent
convertible bonds investors in combination with the threat of
dilution to existing shareholders could create overall increased
pressure on managers to avoid the conversion of any portion of
the CCBs.
Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation packages may increase and optimize the signaling
of default risk at a time when the risk of default is present but
still somewhat remote. Various existing measures signal default
risk.182 Early triggers in executive compensation, however, signal
180. A possible downside of early conversion as a warning signal could be
added pressure on the stock price, which could have negative effects in a
pending crisis.
181. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (arguing that increased shareholder
democracy will improve corporate governance and enhance managerial
accountability, thereby curbing abuses of authority and misconduct); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006) (“With stock ownership divided among many
owners, shareholders have little incentive to exert effort to monitor
management and actively intervene in corporate decisionmaking.”); Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 530–66 (1990)
(providing an overview of various legal obstacles to shareholder action).
182. Existing signaling mechanisms for default risk, such as credit default
swap pricing and Capital Asset management, Management, Earnings, and asset
Liability management (CAMEL) ratings, do not seem to have provided sufficient
protection for SIFIs during the past crisis. CAMEL ratings and credit default
swap pricing did not suffice to signal default risk in the cases of Lehman
Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch. See generally Aline Darbellay &
Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies and Regulatory Reform, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell eds., 2012); Tao Sun, Identifying Vulnerabilities in Systemically-
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an entity’s default risk much sooner than previously proposed
triggers for contingent convertible bonds issued to investors and
other mechanisms. The benefits of this early default signal
include more time for managers to (1) adjust to the current
market conditions, (2) lower their risk-taking, and (3) deleverage
in a comparatively liquid market environment. The improved
signaling of default risk through the early conversion of
executives’ CCBs may help address the systemic risks that SIFIs
pose. Early triggers in CCBs, when used in executive
compensation, can improve the core function of CCBs, that is,
lowering systemic risk.
Important Financial Institutions in a Macro-Financial Linkages Framework
(IMF Working Paper No. 11/111, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848543. Although CAMEL ratings may reach the
public through bank financial statements and other disclosures made after a
downgrade, CAMEL ratings are only released to top management. See Allen N.
Berger & Sally M. Davies, The Information Content of Bank Examinations, 14 J.
FIN. SERVS. RES. 117, 119 (1994) (“[B]ank examination data currently are
confidential . . . .”); R. Alton Gilbert, Kevin L. Kliesen, Andrew P. Meyer &
David C. Wheelock, Federal Reserve Lending to Troubled Banks During the
Financial Crisis 9 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-006A,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038578
(“Examination ratings are not released publicly, but are made available both to
the examined institution and to supervisory authorities . . . .”); John S. Jordan,
Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Impact of Greater Bank Disclosure Amidst a
Banking Crisis 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1998),
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp1999/wp99_1.pdf (“Most countries disclose
little, if any, of their supervisory assessment of banks.”); Donald P. Morgan,
Judging the Risk of Banks: What Makes Banks Opaque? 1–7 (Fed. Res. Bank of
N.Y., Working Paper No. 98-05, 1998), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research
/staff_reports/research_papers/9805.pdf (discussing the characteristics of banks
that make it difficult for outsiders to judge their level of risk). There is also
some evidence that on-site bank exams can provide additional information
beyond what is publicly available. See Robert DeYoung, Mark J. Flannery,
William W. Lang & Sorin M. Sorescu, The Informational Advantage of
Specialized Monitors: The Case of Bank Examiners 23 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 98-4, 1998), http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/
publications/working_papers/1998/wp98_4.pdf (finding that CAMEL ratings
contain more information than is publicly available). CAMEL ratings also may
require on-site examinations to verify the accuracy of reports and to gather
further supervisory information. See Jose A. Lopez, Using CAMELS Ratings to
Monitor Bank Conditions, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed. Res. Bank of S.F.), June
11, 1999, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el9919.html (describing on-site examinations); Bolton, Mehran & Shapiro, supra
note 19, at 1 (suggesting a reduction in excessive risk-taking by tying CEO
compensation to the financial firm’s credit default swap spread—a high CDS
results in lower compensation and vice versa).

1866

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012)

The hybrid nature of contingent convertible bonds and the
early conversion from debt to equity aligns the interests of
executives equally with creditors and shareholders.183 Before the
unlikely but theoretically possible conversion into equity,
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation align the
interests of executives with holders of traditional debt and debt in
the form of contingent convertible bonds. Because executives
would be holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon
payments, executives would have incentives to manage the
company with the interests of debt-holders in mind.184 How well
these incentives work may depend on the proportion of debt in
the compensation packages of executives. Managers’ level of risktaking and their strategic management of the entity could become
more focused on long-term and sustainable development as a
result of the interest alignment between managers and debt183. Traditionally, because shareholders elected directors and senior
executives played a major role in this process, executives’ interests were aligned
with shareholder interests. See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at
655–56 (showing the enormous influence CEOs can have in the election of
directors and other governance issues). The emphasis on equity-based
instruments in executive compensation has made a large proportion of
executives’ compensation dependent on stock performance, which aligns
executives’ interests with the interests of shareholders. See Core, Guay &
Larcker, supra note 19 (synthesizing the broad literature on equity
compensation and executive incentives, and highlighting topics that seem
especially appropriate for future research); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON.
225, 226–27 (1990) (estimating the magnitude of the various mechanisms
through which compensation policy can provide value-increasing incentives,
including performance-based bonuses and salary revisions, stock options, and
performance-based dismissal decisions); Meulbroek, supra note 19, at 5
(“Finance theory has long made the case for the use of equity-linked
compensation plans as an effective means to align managers’ incentives with
those of shareholders. In the last decade, finance practice, particularly in the
United States, has embraced this prescription . . . .”); cf. Guido A. Ferrarini &
Maria C. Ungureanu, Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for
Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European
Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431, 460 (2011) (explaining that the French banking
model endured the crisis better than the traditionally liberal British model
because of heavy regulation). Without a substantial portion of compensation in
the form of debt instruments, managers may give into shareholder pressure to
take higher risks for higher returns.
184. Managing the entity in the interest of debt-holders has implications for
risk-taking, income inequality, and the sustainable development of the entity.
See infra Part VI (discussing the impact of the proposed design on income
inequality and sustainability).
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holders and managers’ changed incentives.185 Because the early
trigger for executives’ contingent convertible bonds also protects
shareholders and their interest in the continuing existence of the
entity,186 executives’ interests may be equally aligned with
shareholders187 at a time when it is most needed.188
If contingent convertible bonds replace a portion of equitybased compensation, contingent convertible bonds could lower
income inequality189 and increase sustainability. If financial
institutions begin using CCBs in executive compensation
packages, depending on the calibration of the packages, the
185. Given that the average tenure of executives in the United States is less
than seven years, interest alignment between managers and debt-holders is
somewhat limited. However, debt in executive compensation could help shift
executives’ management style so that it increasingly includes a long-term
perspective. Managing for the long-term, in turn, could translate into longer
tenures for executives. For a discussion of the increasing turnover rate of CEOs
in the United States, see, for example, Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A.
Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012)
(stating that a study of CEO tenure revealed that “[a]nnual turnover is 15.8%
from 1992 to 2007, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than 7 years . . . .
Since 2000, total CEO turnover increases to about 16.8%, implying an average
CEO tenure of about 6 years.”); see also The Doofus Factor: How Can You Tell a
Good Board of Directors from a Bad One? ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 69,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 21529101 (“During the past decade
the average tenure of chief executives has fallen to 6.6 years from 8.1 years,
according to a recent study by Booz & Co, a consultancy.”).
186. See infra Part VI (elaborating on improved incentives for lowering risk,
improved signaling of default risk, and improved monitoring).
187. Regardless of compensation policies, the strong relationship between
managers and shareholders will likely endure. It is unlikely that firms will
compensate managers entirely with debt. See infra Part VI.A (discussing
contingent capital as inside debt).
188. The early trigger design could help align the interests of the two most
powerful constituents in a financial institution at a time when it is most needed.
Because executives become equity holders at a time when their actions should
be most aligned with equity holders’ interests, that is, early before a possible
insolvency of the entity, the early trigger design enables a shift in executive
compensation and a corresponding interest alignment when it is most needed.
Although the interests of managers are likely to be more aligned with those of
shareholders, executives who hold hybrid securities may be incentivized to
manage for the long-term and sustainable development of the entity and avoid
volatility.
189. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation
Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 586, 588, 596–97 (2007–2008) (arguing that
reforming executive compensation seems to be moderately important in
reducing inequality in the United States).
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replacement of equity-based compensation with contingent
convertible bonds could lower the overall compensation of
executives. Although contingent convertible bonds would likely
pay a substantial coupon rate,190 the return for executives would
likely be incomparable with the return attainable with stock
options and other equity-based compensation. If stock options are
replaced with CCBs, not only would the total compensation for
executives be lowered; short-termism and executives’ focus on
quarterly stock price performance would also be disincentivized.
Executives are more likely to consider the sustainable
development of the entity when stock price appreciation no longer
directly benefits them personally. However, it is important to
note that path dependencies in the executive compensation
culture191 in the United States could make the lowering of overall
compensation for executives and the addition of new design
elements in executive compensation difficult.
C. Design Features to Avoid Abuse
If SIFI executives are compensated with contingent
convertible bond instruments, opportunism could lead them to
manipulate the triggering event to obtain stock upon contingent
convertible bonds’ conversion at a depressed price before or
during a crisis.192 For instance, the conversion into equity at a
190. See Kaal, supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the coupon
rate of between 7% and 9.2% paid by previously issued CCBs).
191. See generally Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path
Dependence and Complementarity in Corporate Governance, in CONVERGENCE
AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J.
Roe eds., 2004); Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and
Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND.
L. J. 723, 764–65 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129–
34 (1999) (proposing the “path dependence theory” where a country’s corporate
law structure depends on the history of corporate law in that country); Hill &
McDonnell, supra note 1; Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies:
Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 147 (2001). But cf. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205–06 (1995)
(challenging path dependence theory).
192. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 7, 10 (“[T]he trigger
metric could be undermined if it could be manipulated . . . .”). “With a trigger
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value of $3 with a book value of $10 would create a substantial
payoff. Opportunism may lead executives to disregard the impact
of triggering the conversion on their reputation and career
development prospects if the payoff is substantial.
Without rules and regulatory guidance regarding the design
and issuance of contingent convertible bonds, SIFI executives
may only be curtailed by their fiduciary duties. Existing fiduciary
duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse if
the payoff for executives is substantial.193 Contingent convertible
bondholders, regular bondholders, and shareholders would
benefit from broader fiduciary duties.194
metric based on a bank’s equity price, there would be a risk that investors may
short-sell a bank’s equity to drive the equity price down in the absence of any
change in the underlying value of a bank’s assets and trigger a conversion event
that results in a transfer of value from existing equity holders to precautionary
contingent capital holders . . . .” Id. “[T]he risk of using market capitalisation to
define the trigger event is that it could give investors an incentive to manipulate
the equity price to trigger a conversion.” Id.
193. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The
Emerging Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATE LAW 133 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); Johnson
& Sides, supra note 26, at 1194 (“[I]n corporate law, where the duties are broad
and usefully ill-defined—decision-makers must act with ‘loyalty’ and ‘care’ and
in ‘good faith,’ but are accorded wide latitude in discharging their governance
responsibilities in conformance with these standards.”); Donald C. Langevoort,
Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1196 (2003) (stating that an impression of tolerance of bad
habits is created by focusing solely on a board’s duty of inquiry without
analyzing the underlying breach of managers’ duty); A. Gilchrist Sparks III &
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate
Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 217 (1992) (explaining the general proposition that
corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as those owed by directors);
Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts:
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 846, 848–49 (2011) (arguing that courts have a stronger doctrine they
can employ when called on to monitor abuses in executive compensation—the
fiduciary duties of officers); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon,
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597,
1600, n.10 (2005) (“[C]ourts and commentators routinely describe the duties of
directors and officers together, and in identical terms.”); Thomas J. Moloney,
Paul R. St. Lawrence, III & Angela F. Hamarich, Fiduciary Duties, BrokerDealers and Sophisticated Clients: A Mis-Match That Could Only Be Made in
Washington, 3 J. SEC. L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 336, 337–42 (2010) (providing an
overview of the fiduciary-duty debate); Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the
Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1200–02 (2011) (analyzing fiduciary duties
in the recent economic downturn).
194. See Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an
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Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 835 (2010) (statement
of John C. Coffee Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law
School) (arguing that legislation is needed “to protect investors and to maintain
market transparency and economic efficiency” and to return to the traditional
norm that brokers should seek “to serve their clients (and not seek to profit from
their losses)”); Danny Busch & Deborah A. DeMott, Liability of Asset Managers
(Introduction), in LIABILITY OF ASSET MANAGERS (Danny Busch & Deborah A.
DeMott eds., 2012); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011) (clarifying the
theoretical underpinning for an expansive version of fiduciary duties and
applying fiduciary theory to such contemporary problems as those in the
securities industry and the professions, as well as to corporate issues such as
executive compensation); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties
and the Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 47 (2011)
(“[A]lthough the existing framework for broker-dealer regulation is robust, it
could be fine-tuned by possibly adding an express fiduciary duty requirement as
well as more specific rule-based prohibitions.”); Douglas C. Michael, The
Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive
Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L. 785, 786, 824 (1992) (arguing that officers should
have a “duty not to accept unreasonable compensation” and that courts should
use officers’ fiduciary duties to engage in a sweeping review of the
reasonableness of compensation); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil
the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005) (“[L]egal liability represents an essential
mechanism for ensuring directors’ fidelity to their fiduciary duties and for
questioning reform efforts that do not include such liability.”). For advocates of a
fiduciary duty to bondholders, see, for example, LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Margaret M.
Blair, Stakeholders as Shareholders, Ownership and Control: Rethinking
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150
(1996); William W. Bratton Jr., Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1992); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 305; David
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24
IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate
Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The
Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that
Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 (1997).
Contra Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an
Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 835 (2010) (statement
of Larry E. Ribstein, Associate Dean for Research & Mildred Van Voorhis Jones
Chair, University of Illinois College of Law); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing
Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2011) (arguing for a more precise
definition and more limited application of fiduciary duties because their
usefulness depends on differentiation from other duties that apply in other
settings). For cases that discuss officers’ fiduciary duties, see generally Hill &
McDonnell, supra note 193, at 133.
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In practice, the proportion of contingent convertible bond
instruments in the total mix of executive compensation packages
will likely be limited, which may counteract possible abuse. A
mandatory holding period for all equity securities held by
executives in the entity they manage195 after the conversion of
their contingent convertible bonds into equity takes place would
help limit possible abuse. A broader approach to curtail abuse
could entail the cancellation of any stock options or other equitybased pay arrangements in the compensation packages of
executives upon the conversion of executives’ CCBs. Ultimately,
manager/agent opportunism that results from the design of CCBS
triggers and managers’ participation in the design may
necessitate regulatory guidance in the form of general principles
or best practice guidelines for the design of CCBs and their
issuance to investors and executives.
Although executives are unlikely to be directly involved in
designing their own contingent convertible bond awards,
executives often have a strong involvement and influence in the
executive compensation process.196 Assuming that executives act
opportunistically197 within the bounds of their fiduciary duties,
executives may not create socially optimal designs for contingent
convertible bonds. Executives’ opportunism and involvement in
drafting the trigger could result in suboptimal early triggers in
contingent convertible bonds issued to executives. If the trigger
design allows executives to influence the early trigger, the
suboptimal early trigger could increase the potential for abuse
because executives may use the trigger to obtain cheap stock
during a crisis. If executives are involved in drafting the features
of contingent convertible bonds issued to investors, their
opportunism could result in contingent convertible bond designs
that do not result in a significant threat of equity dilution upon
conversion and other governance-improving design features.198
Because regulators and others are unlikely to provide rules,
195. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 2–3 (discussing equity-based
compensation).
196. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2.
197. See supra Part IV (showing that the incomplete contract theory model
acknowledges agent opportunism in the analysis of executive compensation
policies).
198. Kaal, supra note 14.
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guidelines, and best practice guidance for contingent convertible
bond designs and issuances anytime soon, executives may
continue to have a strong involvement in the design of contingent
convertible bonds.199 Regulatory guidance on contingent capital
designs and issuances may be needed to curtail the involvement
of executives in the design of contingent convertible bonds and
create socially optimal designs.200 Contingent convertible bonds
with early triggers in executive compensation could help create
socially optimal designs for contingent convertible bonds issued to
investors.201
VI. Implications for Academic Debates
Instituting contingent convertible bonds with early triggers
in executive compensation packages adds a new perspective to
the academic debate in the context of inside debt, the creditorcentered approach to executive compensation, and the design of
triggering events.202 As a result of their early conversion into
equity (or the threat thereof), contingent convertible bonds
provide several advantages beyond the benefits of traditional
inside debt instruments in executive compensation.203 Contingent
convertible bonds also add benefits to the creditor-centered
approach to executive compensation.204 In the context of the
creditor-centered approach, adding contingent convertible bonds
or replacing other debt instruments in executive compensation
199. Institution- and industry-specific knowledge may make executives
indispensable in drafting contingent convertible bonds. Regulatory guidelines
and best practice guidance for contingent convertible bond designs could help
ensure that executives are sufficiently involved but do not create socially
suboptimal designs.
200. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 139–41 (noting that private ordering and
market mechanisms may not result in socially optimal designs for contingent
convertible bonds).
201. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing the benefits of a design with early
triggers).
202. See supra Part VI.A–C (discussing contingent capital as inside debt,
improving the creditor-centered approach, and the impact of ownership
characteristics on trigger design).
203. See infra Part VI.A (discussing contingent capital as inside debt).
204. See infra Part VI.B (discussing ways to improve the creditor-centered
approach).
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packages with contingent convertible bonds can optimize
managers’ risk incentives, especially in comparison with
traditional debt instruments in executive compensation
packages.205 In the context of the debate on trigger designs,
contingent convertible bonds with early triggers show that the
ownership characteristics of the contingent convertible
bondholders can have an impact on the efficient design of
contingent capital triggers.206
A. Contingent Capital as Inside Debt
Empirical studies have demonstrated that risk-taking
declines if executives hold more debt relative to their equity
holdings.207 Inside debt may be defined as a corporation’s debt
205. See infra Part VI.B (discussing ways to improve the creditor-centered
approach).
206. See infra Part VI.C (discussing the impact of ownership characteristics
on trigger design).
207. See Calcagno & Renneboog, supra note 82, at 1808–09 (maintaining
that the increase in the leverage of Anglo-American corporations has stimulated
interest in the role of debt as a direct incentive device for managers to generate
stronger corporate performance and showing that including risky debt in the
capital structure changes a principal’s “incentive to give incentives”); see also
Edmans & Liu, supra note 82 (arguing that a debt bias can improve executives’
efforts as well as deter risk-shifting); Tao-Hsien Dolly King & Min-Ming Wen,
Shareholder and Bondholder Governance, and Managerial Risk-Taking, 35 J.
BANKING & FIN. 512, 530 (2011) (showing that strong bondholder governance
incentivizes low-risk investments); Ortiz-Molina, supra note 82, at 78–83, 90–91
(examining how CEO compensation is related to firms’ capital structures and
arguing that the hypothesis that debt reduces manager–shareholder conflicts
can explain some—but not all—of the results); Sundaram & Yermack, supra
note 8; Gerakos, supra note 8, at 23 (finding that pension benefits may reduce
risk-taking); Tung & Wang, supra note 8 (showing that their empirical evidence
provides a rationale for the use of inside debt compensation in structuring
executive compensation in the banking context); Wei & Yermack, supra note 8.
Other studies reject the idea that corporate governance and executive
compensation are correlated. See Core et al., supra note 8, at 385–88; Dorff,
supra note 169, at 5; Johnson et al., supra note 169, at 17, 38; Carter & Lynch,
supra note 169, at 222 (finding no relationship between institutional ownership
and the re-pricing decision); see also Anderson & Bizjak, supra note 169, at
1344; Wan, supra note 169, at 23 ( “[There is] no systematic evidence that board
composition affects change in CEO compensation.”). Some scholars argue that
there is no role for inside debt in executive compensation because bonuses,
salaries, and managerial reputation constitute adequate remedies to debt’s
agency costs. See David Hirshleifer & Anjan V. Thakor, Managerial
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held by firm insiders.208 Inside debt, which includes pensions and
deferred compensation,209 is already a substantial part of
executive compensation in the United States.210 Unlike equitybased compensation, inside debt creates fixed claims for
managers with a stake in the firm’s liquidation value, which
reduces risk-taking incentives for executives and the associated
agency costs.211 When managers have a stake in the liquidation
value of the firm, they are more likely to increase their efforts in
the vicinity of insolvency.212 Inside debt could provide adequate
signaling of managers’ risk-taking.213
Inside debt in the form of contingent convertible bonds has
characteristics that could prove preferable to traditional inside
debt.214 Managers’ inside debt stake in the firm’s liquidation

Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 437 (1992); James A.
Brander & Michael Poitevin, Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of
Debt Finance, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 55 (1992); Teresa A. John &
Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN.
949, 969–71 (1993).
208. Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 588 (“CEO inside debt holdings (pension
benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded
liabilities of the firm.”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 75 (defining inside
debt as debt—or any security with payoffs very similar to debt—held by the
manager, and contrasting it with outside debt, which is held by external
investors); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 352 (defining inside debt as
“debt held by the manager”).
209. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 76 (“U.S. CEOs hold substantial
defined benefit pensions. These are unsecured, unfunded obligations which, in
nearly all cases, have equal priority with other creditors in bankruptcy and thus
constitute inside debt.”); Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1 (“The most
common form of these intracompany IOUs are benefit pensions and deferred
compensation.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 13 (defining bank CEOs’ inside
debt as the present value of the CEO’s pension and deferred compensation
balances).
210. See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8.
211. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82 (showing that the probability of default
and the manager’s ability to affect liquidation values affect the appropriate
amount of inside debt).
212. Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 4.
213. Tung, supra note 9, at 35 (arguing that subordinated inside debt on the
subsidiary level is preferable to debt of the holding company for signaling).
Contra Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2, at 273–97 (proposing to pay
executives through debt of the bank holding company).
214. See supra Part V.B.2 (elaborating on the benefits of an early trigger
design).
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value and the associated governance benefits215 incentive
optimization216 and reduction of agency costs217 depend on the
solvency of the respective entity. Inside debt without a conversion
feature provides no mechanism to ensure the solvency of the
entity. Contingent convertible bonds with a conversion feature
offer the additional benefit of creating an early warning system
and a buffer before insolvency that can help an entity avoid
default.218 As a debt instrument with an early trigger before
conversion, contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation have all the benefits of inside debt219 in addition to
the benefits of an early trigger design.220
Because the contingent convertible bonds in executive
compensation packages would convert into equity early before
insolvency, the value of the equity after conversion of the
respective executives’ contingent convertible bonds before
bankruptcy could still be higher than the liquidation value of
215. Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 589 (“[O]ther studies find that inside
debt holdings are associated with higher firm liquidation value . . . and lower
credit default swap spreads . . . .”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 79;
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1558; Tung, supra note 9, at 26.
216. Tung, supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that market pricing of inside debt is
particularly sensitive to downside risk and that including inside debt in
bankers’ compensation packages could therefore give managers “direct personal
incentives to avoid excessive risk”).
217. Id.; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30; Sundaram & Yermack,
supra note 8, at 1572 (“[D]ebt-based compensation reduces the agency costs of
debt . . . we should observe a positive association between the CEO’s debt-toequity ratio and the firm’s leverage.”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 79
(demonstrating that inside debt is a superior remedy to the agency costs of debt
than the bonuses advocated by prior research).
218. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14 (discussing the use of contingent
capital to create a buffer in the vicinity of bankruptcy).
219. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 92 (“Inside debt can be a more
effective solution to creditor expropriation than salaries, bonuses, reputation
and private benefits, owing to its sensitivity to liquidation value.”); Sundaram &
Yermack, supra note 8, at 1558, 1583 (“Inside equity aligns managers with
equity holders in good states, but inside debt aligns managers with debt-holders
in bad states . . . . Debt-based compensation provides managers with interesting
incentives to reduce the agency costs of debt.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at
26 (“CEOs’ inside debt holdings preceding the Crisis are significantly positively
associated with bank performance and significantly negatively associated with
bank risk taking during the Crisis.”).
220. See supra Part V.B.2 (explaining the benefits of the early trigger
design).
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traditional inside debt.221 Unlike the liquidation value of
traditional inside debt, the equity in executives’ portfolios after
the conversion of the contingent convertible bonds can still be
increased because the early trigger creates a substantial buffer
before insolvency.222 Contingent convertible bonds as inside debt
would not only have the benefits of inside debt before conversion,
but would also provide significant incentives for management to
maintain the value of equity after conversion.223
Contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation
could also help optimize inside debt instruments to incentivize
lower risk-taking by managers. Similar to other inside debt
instruments, the market price of contingent convertible bonds
would likely be affected by managers’ risk-taking.224 Like
subordinated inside debt on the subsidiary level,225 before
conversion into equity, contingent convertible bonds can
incentivize executives to lower their risk-taking because
contingent convertible bond prices are sensitive to downside risks
of SIFIs, including the risk of default.226 Contingent convertible
221.

See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 233–34
A common denominator in the proposals on the use of
contingent capital in the context of avoiding future crises could
be the issuance of a . . . percentage of a financial institution’s
long-term debt capital as convertible debt securities that
convert into equity when triggered by financial weakening of
the . . . institution. However, debt–equity conversion is not a
new concept. The financial crisis has drawn increasing
attention to this concept because the conversion of debt into
equity could be an attractive alternative to forcing strained, but
not insolvent, financial institutions into restructuring or
liquidation.
222. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 293 (“Strained financial institutions may
find the automatic conversion of debt into equity an attractive alternative to
being forced into restructuring or liquidation.”).
223. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text (explaining how the
conversion of contingent capital bonds creates incentives for managers).
224. See Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the pricing sensitivity
of inside bank debt on the subsidiary level with regard to executive risk-taking).
Contra Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 269–74 (suggesting that
managers’ risk-taking probably does not affect inside debt in the form of debt of
the bank holding company to a great extent).
225. See Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 35 (providing tables on
subordinated inside debt at the subsidiary level).
226. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 6 (arguing that the
pricing of contingent convertible bonds could be a guide to the markets’ view on
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bonds, however, provide an additional feature. Upon the
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds,227 the downside
pressure on equity places additional weight on the value of the
equity portion of executives’ pay packages.228 Upon conversion,
the executives would not only forego the contingent convertible
bonds in their compensation packages, but they would also hold
converted equity and equity held prior to the conversion at a
depressed value. The price-sensitivity-induced incentives for
lowering risk before conversion and the new emphasis on the
equity portion of the pay package after conversion create a
combined effect on executives’ incentives. This combined effect
could create comparatively stronger incentives for executives to
take fewer risks in order to avoid the triggering event.229 The
emphasis in this design is on incentives that lower executives’
risk-taking and help avoid the early trigger.230
Critics argue that liquidity shocks and other exogenous
factors could influence debt trading prices unrelated to managers’
the riskiness of financial institutions).
227. The conversion of contingent convertible bonds signals to the market
that the entity could be insolvent which might result in downside pressure on
the stock price. See Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 146, at 6 (“[C]ontingent
capital is essentially a junior debt that converts to equity shares when the stock
price reaches a certain low threshold.”).
228. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 6 (“But it seems
unlikely that precautionary contingent capital could be less costly than
equity . . . . [I]f the private information is primarily about the downside risk
faced by a bank, the values of equity and precautionary contingent capital could
be similarly affected by this private information.”).
229. See id. at 8 (“The presence of precautionary contingent capital could
also risk creating systemic problems in other ways if bank equity holders or
managers seek to avoid the trigger event . . . . [M]anagers could have an
incentive to do this if they fear that conversion could lead to their
replacement.”). Managing to avoid the triggering event alone may be possible by
ignoring the other interests of various constituents. See id. (“If the trigger
metric depends on a bank’s ratio of capital-to-assets or risk-weighted assets,
incumbent equity holders or managers could try to reduce assets to push the
ratio up and away from the trigger value.”).
230. Executives are unlikely to increase their risk-taking after conversion of
their CCBs to salvage the equity value of their portfolio because of the public
nature of the trigger, the entity’s vicinity to bankruptcy, and managers’ inability
to obtain other forms of financing if they increase the risk profile of the entity.
See supra Part V.C (suggesting a mandatory holding period upon the conversion
of executives’ contingent convertible bonds for all equity in the entity the
executives manage).

1878

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012)

risk-taking, making debt at the subsidiary level less useful for
signaling.231 Contingent convertible bonds should be less prone to
liquidity shocks because of their inordinately high coupon rate of
between 7% and 9.5%.232 Although there is no assurance that
oversubscribed issuances233 guarantee future liquidity, the
coupon rates of contingent convertible bonds could help hedge the
liquidity risk.234
Critics also allege that the inside debt theory of executive
compensation ignores suboptimal short- and long-term incentives
that may result from the inclusion of long-term debt in the
231. See Sepe, supra note 1, at 211 (arguing that the creditor-centered
approach is flawed for three reasons: (1) banks’ debt obligations include, in large
part, private debt; (2) bank-issued bonds trade at a markedly lower volume than
bank equity; and (3) bank liabilities not included on balance sheets exist but
their existence is difficult to demonstrate).
232. See Press Release, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Grp. Executes
Agreement to Put in Place CHF 6 Billion of Tier 1 Buffer Capital Notes (Feb. 14,
2011), available at https://emagazine.credit-suisse.com/app/article/index.cfm?
fuseaction=OpenArticle&aoid=300208&coid=293554&lang=EN; Press Release,
Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Group Places 7.875% Tier 2 Buffer Capital Notes
(Feb. 17, 2011), available at https://publications.credit-suisse.com/app/
article/index.cfm?fuseaction%20=OpenArticle&aoid=300504&coid=293551&lang=
EN (“The Tier 2 BCNs were offered on a ‘Regulation S-only’ basis outside the US
and other restricted jurisdictions in a minimum denomination of USD 100,000.
The USD 2 billion Tier 2 BCNs will initially carry a coupon rate of 7.875% per
annum.”). Regarding the Barclays issuance and coupon rate, see supra notes
134–35; see also Paul Clarke, BarCap’s 7% Coco Coupon Is Decidedly More
Generous Than Most Deferred Bonuses, REUTERS, (Apr. 20, 2011), available at
http://news.reuters.efinancialcareers.co.uk/News_ITEM/newsItemId-32101 (“The
coupon rate of 7% is not just too generous for shareholders, it also outstrips the
rate of interest being paid on most other deferred cash bonuses.”); Treanor,
supra note 135, at 50 (“The Barclays cocos would pay a 7% coupon—or rate of
interest—annually, not compounded.”).
233. See Katharina Bart, Credit Suisse Sells $2 Billion of Co-Cos to Public,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2011, 6:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704546704576150861690164484.html (“A person familiar
with the situation said the issue was oversubscribed.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Watkins, Credit Suisse to Use ‘Cocos’ to
Raise Sfr250M, FT.COM, (Mar. 7, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/e77c968c-686e-11e1-b803-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xgvtwSc2 (“The bank
last year raised $2bn using cocos in a heavily oversubscribed issue.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note
140, at 9 (stating that the CS issue was around eleven times oversubscribed); see
also Kaal, supra note 14, at 312–15.
234. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 15 (explaining the
effects of varying coupon rates).
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compensation packages of executives.235 They argue that longterm debt securities in the compensation packages of executives
will not disincentivize high-risk, short-term transactions because
managers can expect short-term gains that exceed the discounted
value of their long-term debt securities.236 Adding contingent
convertible bonds with early triggers as part of the inside debt
portion of executives’ compensation packages could change
managers’ incentives. Executives would no longer simply focus on
the debt versus equity portion of their portfolio; they would also
consider the effects of triggering events.237 In the day-to-day
operation of the business, managers would need to consider the
triggering event of a substantial portion of their outstanding debt
instruments and the implications that a triggering event would
have on the entity and their personal finances.238 Managing to
avoid the early trigger would allow for enough risk-taking by
managers to generate sufficient returns but, at the same time,
would curtail risk-taking enough to avoid the negative effects of
the triggering event.239
235. See Sepe, supra note 1, at 223 (“Accordingly, the theory overlooks the
perverse incentives long-term debt may produce both in the short- and longrun.”).
236. See id. (“Tying managers’ financial rewards to debt securities with a
long-term maturity will not induce managers to refrain from taking risky bets in
the short run, because the expected short-term gains from these bets will tend to
exceed the discounted value of managers’ debt holdings.”). With equity-based
compensation in managers’ compensation packages, managers may still be
incentivized to drive up the stock price and exercise stock options at an
opportune time. However, risk-taking generated by equity-based pay can be
overcome if the calibration of debt- and equity-based compensation in the
executive compensation package favors debt and requires a minimal holding
period. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 361–62 (discussing the equitybased part of the compensation package).
237. See supra Part V.B (discussing the effects of triggering events and
management incentives). Triggering events in contingent capital securities can
take various forms. The debate on what triggers should be used is ongoing. See
Kaal, supra note 14, at 300 (“While institution-specific triggers would
presumably grant most certainty to market participants, regulatory trigger
designs could provide lower levels of certainty.”); Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14,
at 233–38 (examining the different trigger designs and their effects on risktaking).
238. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting studies that explore
how managers behave depending on the ratio of their debt to their equity).
239. These are ideal typical model assumptions. However, with the right
trigger design, executives’ incentives and interests could be substantially
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B. Improving the Creditor-Centered Approach

Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in executive
compensation can help to improve the creditor-centered approach
to executive compensation. Existing compensation practices have
an effect on managers’ risk-taking and risk preferences as well as
the firm’s long-term profitability and sustainability.240 Including
improved. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 95, at 3 (“The fact that the dualtrigger structure permits banks to sometimes fail addresses the concern that
contingent capital would blunt the incentive effects of debt.”).
240. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 671 (“Unlike defined
contribution plans, which force the employee to bear the risk of poor investment
performance, defined benefit plans shift the risk of investment performance to
the firm.”); Carl R. Chen, Thomas L. Steiner & Ann Marie Whyte, Does Stock
Option-Based Executive Compensation Induce Risk-Taking? An Analysis of the
Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 915, 916 (2006) (“The compensation
level and structure employed by each bank has implications for risk-taking and
for the agency relation between managers and stockholders.”); Jeffrey L. Coles,
Naveen D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking,
79 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 442–43 (2006) (providing empirical evidence of a strong
causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt
policy, and firm risk); Robert Haugen & Lemma Senbet, Resolving the Agency
Problems of External Capital Through Options, 36 J. FIN. 629, 640 (1981)
(“[T]here may remain an incentive for the manager to engage in either high or
low risk investment programs. This is the well-known wealth transfer problem
associated with the existence of risky debt in the capital structure.”); Jenson &
Meckling, supra note 30, at 309–10 (“[Existing] literature focuses almost
exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to
structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between
the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make
choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare . . . .”); Kose John, Anthony
Saunders & Lemma W. Senbet, Perspectives on Bank Capital Regulation and
Managerial Compensation, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 735 (1995); Clifford W. Smith
& Rene M. Stulz, The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies, 20 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 391, 399 (1985) (suggesting that shareholders can affect
management’s risk aversion through the design of compensation contracts);
Bolton, Mehran, & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1 (“[S]tructuring CEO incentives
to maximize shareholder value in a levered firm tends to encourage excess risk
taking.”); COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, TOP 10 RED FLAGS TO WATCH
FOR WHEN CASTING AN ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE PAY 1 (2010), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/March%202010
%20-%20Say%20on%20Pay%20Checklist.pdf (“Poorly-designed incentives can
promote excessive risk-taking and get-rich quick mentalities—key contributors
to the financial crisis.”). Several empirical studies have explored the connection
between managerial stock, option holdings, or both, and financial strategy or
corporate focus (such as leverage, repurchase, or the extent of derivatives usage
and hedging). See generally Anup Agrawal & Gershon Mandelker, Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J. FIN. 823
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in executive compensation packages a basket of securities that
represents a predefined percentage of the common shares could
help address the shortcomings of existing executive compensation
practices.241
Adding contingent convertible bonds to the basket of
securities in executive compensation could further improve
executive compensation practices. Like other debt securities in
executive compensation, contingent convertible bonds may
increase sustainability and can help overcome income
inequality.242 If a SIFI issues contingent convertible bonds to
(1987); Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek & David L. Yermack, Managerial
Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411 (1997); Richard
A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson & Thomas S. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock
Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617 (1990); David J.
Denis, Diane K. Denis & Atulya Sarin, Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and
Corporate Diversification, 52 J. FIN. 135 (1997); Wayne R. Guay, The Sensitivity
of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants,
53 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (1999); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure,
Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1995); Hamid Mehran,
Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure, 27 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 539 (1992); Daniel A. Rogers, Does Executive Portfolio
Structure Affect Risk Management? CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Corporate
Derivatives Usage, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 271 (2002); Catherine Schrand & Haluk
Unal, Hedging and Coordinating Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift
Conversions, 53 J. FIN. 979 (1998); Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An
Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining
Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097 (1996); Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and
Incentive Compensation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
w6467, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
226212.
241. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 253, 283–84 (discussing how
executive compensation packages are one of several corporate governance
measures that address excessive risk-taking and how regulating such incentives
should be standard procedure in the future). Weighting debt securities,
including contingent convertible bonds, heavily in the calibration of executive
compensation packages may increase the positive effects of debt in executive
compensation packages. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (expounding
on the positive effects). At the same time, debt may not be the preferred form of
compensation for executives. Calibrating executive compensation packages to
account for desired incentives and governance improvements while giving
sufficient incentives for executives to perform within expected parameters may
require an institution-specific relational approach and learning from experience.
See supra Part IV (discussing the benefits of the incomplete contract theory of
NIE).
242. See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257,
the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on. Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 129 (2007) (testimony of Steven N. Kaplan,
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replace a substantial portion of its executives’ equity-based
compensation, the coupon rate of contingent convertible bonds
(between 7% and 9.5%),243 albeit higher than traditional debt
instruments, could help address concerns over income
inequality.244 For the remaining portion of executives’ equitybased compensation, a mandatory holding period upon the
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds could provide
incentives for sustainability.245 The coupon rate of contingent
convertible bonds may be incomparable with the upside potential
of equity-based compensation, especially for stock options. The
coupon rate of contingent convertible bonds, however, is higher
than the coupon rate of traditional debt instruments.246 This
Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship & Fin., Univ. of Chi., Graduate
Sch. of Bus.) (“[T]he increase in CEO pay is a factor in the increase in income
inequality at the very top end of the income distribution. It is not, however, the
driver of that inequality.”); McDonnell, supra note 189, at 1 (elaborating on
general inequality as a concern); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income
Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 32 (2003) (“Part of
the recent increase in top wages is due to the development of stock options that
are reported as wages and salaries on tax returns when they are exercised.”);
Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where
We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them
24 (Eur. Corporate Gov’t Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 (“The pay for chief
executive officers (CEOs) in large US firms increased dramatically over the past
three decades, driven by an explosion in grants of share options.”); Steven N.
Kaplan & Joshua D. Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the
Rise in the Highest Incomes? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 13270, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=931280
Inequality today at the top end of the income distribution can
be attributed to four different sectors of the economy—top
executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial
service sector employees from investment banks, hedge funds,
private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); lawyers;
and professional athletes and celebrities.
243. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing Credit Suisse
issuance statistics).
244. See supra Part V (discussing how the governance-improving features of
contingent capital bonds can be applied to executive compensation); supra note
188 and accompanying text (explaining that contingent convertible bonds can
lower income inequality and increase sustainability).
245. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 361 (suggesting a two- to fouryear holding period for equity-based compensation).
246. See Markus Pelger, Contingent Convertible Bonds: Pricing, Dilution
Costs and Effective Regulation 7–11 (Coleman Fung Risk Mgmt. Research Ctr.,
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higher coupon rate could make it a more attractive instrument in
executive compensation.247 The attractive features of CCBs may
help establish CCBs in the executive compensation culture in the
United States and thereby improve corporate governance.
Because of the conversion feature, contingent convertible
bonds may have additional benefits. Unlike traditional debt
instruments in executive compensation, contingent convertible
bonds provide incentives for increased monitoring by creditors
and shareholders. They also align executives’ interests with the
interests of shareholders and creditors.248 Most importantly,
adding contingent convertible bonds or replacing other debt
instruments in executive compensation packages with contingent
convertible bonds with early triggers helps improve managers’
risk incentives.249 The conversion feature of contingent
convertible bonds decreases executives’ risk-taking incentives
because holding a substantial portion of debt rather than equity
disincentivizes short-termism and executives’ focus on quarterly
stock price performance. The early conversion feature also creates
a risk that if executives do not lower their risk-taking and
manage the entity well enough to avoid the trigger, they will
receive equity at a point in time when the equity value will be
substantially diminished.250
Working Paper No. 2012-02, 2012), http://fungcenter.berkeley.edu/resources/
documents/Pelger201202.pdf (providing formulae for calculating coupon rates of
both contingent convertible bonds and traditional debt instruments).
247. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 7 (“The opportunity
to run before conversion could also reduce the incentives of precautionary
contingent capital holders to monitor a bank’s risk-taking and impose market
discipline.”).
248. See supra Part V (discussing how, because shareholders’ interests are
aligned with the entity’s, executives’ interests are also aligned with the
shareholders’ interests).
249. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (examining the effect of
contingent convertible bonds on managers’ risk-taking).
250. The amount to be received upon conversion would depend on the trigger
design. Most triggers currently discussed in the literature favor a conversion
shortly before bankruptcy. If this is the case, the equity received by executives
would be nearly worthless. If the SIFI chooses a contingent capital bond design
with a write-down feature for its executive compensation packages, managers
would perhaps have even less incentive to take risks because they would not get
any financial benefit from the contingent capital bonds if they are triggered into
a write-down. The beneficial effects could increase in proportion to the volume of
contingent convertible bonds issued to executives.
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Replacing a substantial portion of equity-based compensation
with contingent convertible bonds can also help create incentives
for managers to keep the business solvent. During the Financial
Crisis, Lehman Brothers experienced a severe shortfall in
solvency in part because its CEO Richard S. Fuld, Jr. had a
substantial equity stake in the company and, in an effort to
preserve his own interests, refused to pursue a dilutive capital
infusion or sell the firm in order to avoid the firm’s failure (the
Fuld Problem).251 Motivated in part by a desire to address the
Fuld Problem, Jeffrey Gordon suggests using convertible, equitybased pay to compensate executives.252 For example, executives in
financial firms would receive a substantial part of their stockrelated compensation in equity securities that convert to
subordinated debt upon a triggering event.253 Gordon contrasts
convertible equity-based pay with contingent convertible bonds
and argues that contingent convertible bonds would not address
the Fuld Problem.254
If a financial institution issues contingent convertible bonds
to the general public and its executives, and a large part of
equity-based executive compensation is replaced with CCBs,255
SIFI managers may be more concerned with managing the entity
to prevent the early triggering event256 than with averting an
251. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 7 (“This might be called
‘the Fuld Problem’: a CEO who is reluctant to negotiate a large equity raise (or
sell the firm) because the terms would massively dilute his personal equity
stake and who instead may calculate that holding out [will be more beneficial to
him or her].”).
252. See id. at 11 (“[S]enior executives at financial firms should receive a
significant portion of stock-related compensation in the form of equity that will
convert into subordinated debt upon certain external triggering events . . . .”).
253. Id.
254. See id. at 11 n.18 (“Convertible equity-based pay bears a family
resemblance to ‘contingent convertible bonds’ . . . . Among other features, ‘co-cos’
promote shareholder monitoring of managerial risk-taking by providing a
credible threat of dilution in the event of financial distress . . . .”).
255. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 321 (discussing how Credit Suisse and other
SIFIs have already issued contingent convertible bonds to the public); see also
supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that Barclays has already issued
contingent convertible bonds to its executives).
256. See supra Part V.C (explaining how SIFI executives might be led to
manipulate triggering events if they are compensated with contingent
convertible bonds).

CONTINGENT CAPITAL

1885

equity infusion to avoid dilution of their own equity stake. If
executives’ compensation packages do not include a large equity
portion, managers have no incentive to avoid an equity infusion
to preserve the value of their own equity.257 Even if a substantial
portion of executives’ compensation remains equity-based, the
early conversion of contingent convertible bonds affects not only
the debt portion of executives’ compensation but also the value of
the equity portion after the contingent convertible bonds portion
is converted.258 The lower value of the equity portion after the
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds, in combination
with the negative impact of the CCBS conversion on the existing
equity of the respective entity, makes it less likely that executives
will fear the effect of raising additional equity, such as a negative
impact on price and the dilutive effect.259
Because contingent convertible bonds are addressed to the
entire equity base and would, according to some proposals,
become a (mandatory) feature of SIFIs’ balance sheets, the
dilution and the effect on managers could be greater with
convertible equity-based pay.260 However, the effect of the
257. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he holder of [an outof-the-money] option will be indifferent between a stable stock price and further
losses of any magnitude. On the upside, only very large stock price gains will
yield a positive payoff for the option holder.”).
258. See supra Part V.B (examining the consequences of an early conversion
of contingent convertible bonds and the effects of such conversion on executives’
risk-taking). Opportunism may lead managers to increase the risk profile of the
entity after conversion, enabling them to regain the lost equity value in their
portfolio. On the other hand, an increase in the risk profile would affect the
ability of the entity to obtain other forms of financing such as bridge loans. The
increase in the risk profile after conversion is also unlikely because the early
conversion would probably increase CCBs investors’ and shareholders’
monitoring of the entity. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 11 n.18
(“Among other features, ‘co-cos’ promote shareholder monitoring of managerial
risk-taking by providing a credible threat of dilution in the event of financial
distress, because of the automatic conversion of a significant amount of debt into
equity.”).
259. See id. at 11 (“The equity will convert into subordinated debt based on
the value of the converted equity as of a period prior to the conversion
moment . . . . This mechanism both imposes losses on senior management for
deterioration in the firm’s financial condition while giving it a significant stake
in avoiding further deterioration.”).
260. See id. at 11 n.18 (“Assuming that anti-dilution protection is scrubbed
out of managerial compensation contracts, the dilution threat from co-co’s
should also directly affect management behavior.”).
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conversion from equity to debt will largely depend on the trigger
design. There is currently no consensus on the ideal trigger
design for convertible securities.261 Depending on the trigger
design, a mandatory conversion of senior managers’ equity into
subordinated debt on a valuation basis may not lead to a
significant loss if the trigger from equity to subordinated debt
comes after a likely significant loss in the share price of the
entity.262 Although mandatory contingent convertible bond
issuances with predefined triggering events could have better
corporate governance outcomes,263 it is noteworthy that the
contingent convertible bond market has evolved without
mandatory issuances.264 Also, the Fuld Problem265 is only one of
many corporate governance concerns pertaining to SIFIs.266 The
approach in this Article is broader.267 The issuance of contingent
convertible bonds to the public has great potential to improve
several aspects of corporate governance in SIFIs.268 Contingent

261. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 300–01 (describing how different trigger
designs pose different problems); see also Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at
251–57 (showing the uncertainty and risk involved in the different trigger
designs).
262. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 16 (“[A] mandatory
conversion of senior managers’ equity into subordinated debt on valuation
basis . . . [can] impose[] an immediate loss but . . . also [may] preserve[]
incentives to prevent further deterioration of the firm.”).
263. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 317 (“The experimentation with different
CCS rules and a mixture of market solutions, private ordering, and mandatory
rules in different jurisdictions could help avoid a ‘stable rule’ and permit
dynamic regulation.”).
264. See id. at 308–12 (discussing the evolving market in contingent capital).
265. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (defining “the Fuld
Problem”).
266. Another similar problem is that “the incentives originating from
corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs.” Kaal & Henkel, supra
note 14, at 242.
267. The common denominator between Gordon’s proposal and the proposal
in this Article is the avoidance of SIFI resolution and distress in the financial
sector. Compare Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 2 (focusing instead
on the ever-widening gap between executives’ interests and those of
nonmanagerial shareholders), with supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text
(examining contingent corporate bonds’ effect on risk-taking and income
inequality).
268. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 321–22 (“While commercial motives are
certain to have played a major role in the CCS issuance by Credit Suisse and
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convertible bonds in executive compensation can solidify, and in
some cases, intensify the positive effects on corporate
governance.269
C. The Impact of Ownership Characteristics on Trigger Design
The literature on trigger designs of contingent capital focuses
on the efficient calibration of triggering events.270 The efficient
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of
contingent capital because the trigger affects if and when the
conversion of contingent convertible bonds takes place.271 The
efficient conversion of contingent convertible bonds into equity
has substantial implications for the effectiveness of contingent
convertible bonds and their ability to make financial institutions
safer.272
The literature on contingent capital trigger designs is largely
silent regarding the effect of trigger designs on corporate
governance.273 Contingent convertible bonds issued to
Barclays, the use of contingent capital to avoid public sector support and to
compensate executives could be a first step towards corporate governance
reform from within, with potentially larger implications.”).
269. See supra Part V.B (explaining how contingent convertible bonds that
specifically include an early trigger design may optimize the effects on corporate
governance).
270. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 251–52 (“The efficient
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of contingent
capital. . . . Scholars discuss various trigger events that may be categorized as
follows: (1) transactional triggers, (2) automatic triggers, (3) statutory triggers,
and (4) regulatory triggers.”); Kaal, supra note 14, at 298–99 (“The optimal
design of CCS has been the subject of a long academic debate. Unresolved
questions include design features of CCS and the calibration of design features,
the mandatory or voluntary nature of contingent capital, the objectives of CCS,
market evolution, and the volume of CCS issuance, among others.”).
271. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 251 (“The efficient calibration of
triggering events is central to the design of contingent capital. The optimal
design for a trigger event that converts debt into equity is unclear.”).
272. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 224–25 (“Contingent capital is the
predefined conversion of financial institutions’ debt securities upon a triggering
event into equity securities. Pending contingent capital proposals are expected
to make financial institutions more resilient and avoid a future financial
crisis.”).
273. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 300–01 (discussing the potential benefits
and drawbacks of trigger designs, but not addressing trigger designs’ effect on
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executives274 place a new emphasis on the impact of ownership
characteristics on trigger designs. Trigger designs that may work
well in financial institutions with the traditional mix of debtholders and shareholders may be suboptimal if executives also
hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible
bonds.275 The nature of ownership of contingent convertible bonds
may create different demands on the design features. Who owns
the contingent convertible bonds can impact the efficiency,
effectiveness, and corporate governance results of trigger
designs.276 Recognizing that ownership characteristics can have
an impact on the efficient design of contingent capital triggers
can help adjust designs and avoid suboptimal outcomes.277
VII. Conclusion
Contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation are
not a mere theoretical concept. European SIFIs have started to
add contingent convertible bonds to executive compensation
packages.278 Path dependencies could make it difficult to adopt
governance-improving elements in executive compensation
policies in the United States.279 Contingent convertible bonds
display many commercially attractive features that could help
establish these hybrid securities in the compensation packages of
executives in the United States. Like other debt securities in
executive compensation, contingent convertible bonds can lower
income inequality and incentivize the long-term and sustainable
corporate governance).
274. See supra note 134 and Part V.A (reviewing Barclays’s issuance of
contingent convertible bonds to executives).
275. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 301.
276. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 252 (“Constituents favor
trigger designs in accordance with their own utility preferences.”).
277. Adjusting the design of CCBs to take ownership characteristics into
account could complicate this analysis, which already deals with a substantial
number of parameters. However, the design of CCBs should not be compromised
in order to avoid complexity.
278. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing Barclays’s use of
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation).
279. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (identifying path
dependence as an obstacle to the adoption of contingent convertible bonds in the
United States).
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development of SIFIs.280 Additionally, an early trigger design for
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation can help
further improve governance shortcomings in SIFIs.281 Contingent
convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier
signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for
monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for
executives to lower their risk-taking.282

280. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining that if
contingent convertible bonds replace equity-based executive compensation,
contingent convertible bonds may lower income inequality).
281. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text (expanding on the
benefits of an early trigger design).
282. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing how early
trigger designs can incentivize creditors and shareholders to monitor executives’
risk-taking).

